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INTRODUCTION 
The widespread introduction of antibiotics was one of the greatest medical 
accomplishments of the twentieth century, but our success in treating infectious 
diseases has led to a new public health challenge—the emergence and 
proliferation of microorganisms resistant to standard antibacterial therapy.1 
Unfortunately, legal and market structures in the United States have created a 
substantial gap between the private and social value of antibiotics, leading to 
problematic supply and demand incentives and increasingly resistant infections. 
Both hospitals2 and community settings3 report growing resistance problems. 
                                                       
1. We use the term “antibacterial” or “antibiotic” throughout, with full recognition that many 
of the concepts discussed herein also apply to the broader category of antimicrobial agents. We 
focus on the narrower category because antivirals and antiretrovirals may present novel resistance 
and incentive issues that require separate treatment. For example, as discussed below, entry of low-
cost, generic antiretrovirals has saved millions of lives in the battle against AIDS, but similar 
outcomes from generic entry have not been reported in the antibiotic market.  
2. See John P. Burke, Infection Control—A Problem for Patient Safety, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
651 (2003); L. Silvia Munoz-Price & Robert A. Weinstein, Acinetobacter Infection, 358 NEW ENG. 
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Multidrug resistant bacteria are a grave public health concern because they 
put patients at risk for serious illness and possibly death,4 and they place 
increased demand on already strained health care resources.5 Patients with 
resistant infections can lead to increased inpatient hospital costs,6 outpatient 
treatment costs,7 and long-term care spending.8 Life in a post-antibiotic era would 
be remarkably different and less healthy.  
Leading academic groups, public health organizations, and governments 
have recently become more vocal about the problem of drug-resistant infections. 
The Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA) reported that “[i]nfections 
that were once easily curable with antibiotics are becoming difficult, even 
impossible, to treat, and an increasing number of people are suffering severe 
illness—or dying—as a result.”9 The Alliance for the Prudent Use of Antibiotics 
has been focused for many years on resistance stemming from the misuse of 
antibiotics.10 Government agencies in the United States11 and other countries 
have given increasing attention to the topic; as the Select Committee on Science 
and Technology in the United Kingdom House of Lords noted: 
“[T]he inevitable rise and spread of resistance will render existing drugs 
progressively less useful. In the absence of new drugs, this leaves us 
increasingly at the mercy of infections. We cannot eliminate resistance. We can 
                                                                                                                                       
J. MED. 1271 (2008); Melinda M. Neuhauser et al., Antibiotic Resistance Among Gram-Negative 
Bacilli in US Intensive Care Units: Implications for Fluoroquinolone Use, 289 JAMA 885 (2003). 
3. See J. Patrick Powell & Richard P. Wenzel, Antibiotic Options for Treating Community-
Acquired MRSA, 6 EXPERT REV. ANTI-INFECTIVE THERAPY, 299 (2008). 
4. See Yehuda Carmeli et al., Health and Economic Outcomes of Vancomycin-Resistant 
Enterococci, 162 ARCH. INT. MED. 2223 (2002). 
5. Rebecca H. Sunenshine et al., Multidrug-Resistant Acinetobacter Infection Mortality Rate 
and Length of Hospitalization, 13 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 97 (2007). 
6. Heather L. Evans et al., Cost of Gram-Negative Resistance, 35 CRIT. CARE MED. 89 (2007). 
7. See Carl Asche et al., Treatment Costs Associated with Community-Acquired Pneumonia by 
Community Level of Antimicrobial Resistance, 61 J. ANTIMICROBIAL CHEMOTHERAPY 1162 (2008). 
8. See Blair Capitano et al., Cost Effect of Managing Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus 
Aureus in a Long-Term Care Facility, 51 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC’Y 15-16 (2003). 
9. INFECTIOUS DISEASES SOC’Y OF AM., BAD BUGS, NO DRUGS: AS ANTIBIOTIC DISCOVERY 
STAGNATES . . . A PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS BREWS 9 (2004), available at 
http://www.idsociety.org/10x20.htm [hereinafter BAD BUGS]. 
10. Stuart B. Levy, Antibiotic and Antiseptic Resistance: Impact on Public Health, 19 
PEDIATRIC INFECTIOUS DISEASE J. S122 (2000). 
11. See generally FDA TASK FORCE ON ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE: KEY RECOMMENDATIONS 
AND REPORT (2000), available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/downloads/ForConsumers/ 
ConsumerUpdates/UCM243458.pdf  
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however slow it down, by using antibiotics only when necessary, and by 
rigorous infection control and basic hygiene, both informed by thorough 
surveillance.”12 
Many groups, including the Center for Global Development,13 the London 
School of Economics,14 Resources for the Future,15 and the Swedish Presidency 
of the European Union,16 have recently published reports on global antibiotic 
resistance. Despite this focused attention, few concrete, affirmative steps have 
been taken, and the threat of resistance grows. 
 We believe that one of the primary contributors to the problem of 
antibacterial resistance lies in the market for antibiotics, and specifically how 
markets reimburse for drug development and use in this field. Current legal 
structures and market incentives unwittingly accelerate resistance in several 
ways, all rooted in the mismatch between private and social value. First, 
Medicare and U.S. private payor reimbursement17 create certain market 
incentives without adequate concern for the potential social impact on resistance. 
For example, for many years, federal reimbursement under Medicare has 
rewarded hospital-associated infections with additional payments, while failing 
to reimburse for conservation and infection control. While hospitals have 
significant non-financial reasons to control hospital-acquired infections, this 
policy paradoxically rewards bad behavior by paying for hospital infections.18 Or 
                                                       
12. SCI. AND TECH. SELECT COMM. OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, THIRD REPORT: RESISTANCE TO 
ANTIBIOTICS para. 3 (2001), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ 
ld200001/ldselect/ldsctech/56/5602.htm. 
13. RACHEL NUGENT, EMMA BACK & ALEXANDRA BEITH, CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEV., THE RACE 
AGAINST DRUG RESISTANCE (2010), available at http://www.cgdev.org/content/ 
publications/detail/1424207. Professor Outterson was a member of the Working Group on Drug 
Resistance at the Center for Global Development. 
14. ELIAS MOSSIALOS ET AL., LONDON SCH. OF ECON., POLICIES AND INCENTIVES FOR 
PROMOTING INNOVATION IN ANTIBIOTIC RESEARCH (2010), available at 
http://www.se2009.eu/polopoly_fs/1.16814!menu/standard/file/LSE-ABI%20F-Final.pdf. This 
monograph was funded by a grant from the Swedish government. 
15. RAMANAN LAXMINARAYAN ET AL., EXTENDING THE CURE: POLICY RESPONSES TO THE 
GROWING THREAT OF ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE (2007), available at 
http://www.extendingthecure.org/report. 
16. SWEDISH PRESIDENCY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, INNOVATIVE INCENTIVES FOR EFFECTIVE 
ANTIBACTERIALS (2009), available at http://www.se2009.eu/polopoly_fs/1.25861!menu/ 
standard/file/Antibacterials5.pdf. 
17. While our analysis has broader implications, we draw many of our market examples from 
the United States.  
18. Kevin Outterson, Germ Shed Management (2010) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
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take the example of infection control, which experts have lauded as an effective 
public health measure that also conserves antibiotics. Medicare does not have a 
billing code for infection control practices. Because it is not reimbursed, 
infection control does not directly generate revenue. 
Second, some well-intentioned efforts work at cross-purposes, undermining 
effectiveness at a population health level. For instance, the patent system helps 
spur innovation of new drugs, but pending patent expiration may lead antibiotic 
manufacturers to waste their products by promoting drug use for a broad array of 
minor clinical conditions rather than trying to assure that their products are 
limited to the most urgent cases.19 This is a classic example of social value 
exceeding private value.20 Another example of antagonistic incentives involves 
antibiotic conservation and infection control programs. These initiatives reduce 
the inappropriate demand for antibiotics, prevent unnecessary infections, and 
therefore preserve the drugs for more valuable uses. Society benefits, but drug 
companies point out that these programs undercut antibiotic sales.21 Citing the 
lack of appropriately sized and predictable markets, some drug companies have 
fled from antibiotic research, despite the significant clinician demands for 
additional effective therapies. The interactive and dynamic effects among these 
policy options must be mapped and addressed. 
Finally, we must evaluate the cost-effectiveness of potential interventions on 
a population level. From society’s perspective, the NIH severely underfunds 
                                                                                                                                       
author). 
19. The “patent holder waste” hypothesis posits that the patent holder of an antimicrobial will 
tend to over-market (and thereby waste) the product as patent expiry approaches, delivering an 
exhausted antimicrobial to the public domain when generic entry looms. See Eric Kades, 
Preserving a Precious Resource: Rationalizing the Use of Antibiotics, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 611, 648-
52 (2005). But see Kevin Outterson, The Legal Ecology of Resistance: The Role of Antibiotic 
Resistance in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 613 (2010) [hereinafter Legal 
Ecology of Resistance] (developing the theory of patent holder waste); Kevin Outterson, The 
Vanishing Public Domain: Antibiotic Resistance, Pharmaceutical Innovation and Intellectual 
Property Law, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 67, 78-80 (2005) [hereinafter Vanishing Public Domain] 
(critiquing Kades’ approach). 
20. Some policy experts claim that the social value of pharmaceuticals generally exceeds their 
private value. See, e.g., J.D. Kleinke, The Price of Progress: Prescription Drugs in the Health Care 
Market, 20 HEALTH AFF. 43 (2001). For a contrary example of the private value of information 
exceeding the social value, see Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and 
the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561, 565-66 (1971).  
21. See Steven J. Projan, Why is Big Pharma Getting Out Of Antibacterial Drug Discovery?, 6 
CURRENT OPINION MICROBIOLOGY 427, 428-30 (2003). 
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basic research into antibacterial resistance.22 Private markets are unlikely to pick 
up the slack in basic antibiotic research because private actors undersupply 
products with common pool or public goods characteristics. On the other hand, 
some research programs, such as additional antibiotics for self-resolving minor 
infections, appear to be privately valuable, but unnecessary at a population level. 
Some recent proposals could generate private financial gains for companies, 
though they might be counterproductive or cost-ineffective at the population 
level. One example is the proposal to grant wild-card patents for antibiotics, 
rewarding drug companies for antibiotic innovation by granting a longer patent 
on any other drug in the company’s portfolio.23 Wildcard patent proposals may 
cost many billions of dollars, with doubtful social value.24 Essentially, wildcard 
patents tax drugs for heart disease to pay for antibiotic research and development. 
We should not pursue such options without adequately modeling the potential 
gaps between private and social cost, as well as the opportunity cost. 
In previous work, we have described some of the policy options available to 
promote continued antibiotic effectiveness.25 Table 1 displays these options 
graphically, dividing the policy options into eight Sectors. The columns in Table 
1 are the two intermediate policy goals: conservation of existing antibiotics and 
the production of new ones. While we have conceptually separated conservation 
and production into columns, the ultimate policy goal remains continued 
antibiotic effectiveness. Policymakers will need to balance both conservation and 
production to achieve that goal over time. The rows represent the four primary 
legal tools that can be deployed to achieve these goals: property, regulation, 
contract, and tort.26 With Table 1, one can see a broad array of policy options, 
eight Sectors in all. 
                                                       
22. N. Kent Peters et al., The Research Agenda of the National Institute of Allergy and 
Infectious Diseases for Antimicrobial Resistance, 197 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASE 1087, 1087 (2008). 
23. See infra Section III.B for a critique of patent-based incentives for antibiotic development. 
24. Kevin Outterson, Julie Balch Samora & Karen Keller-Cuda, Will Longer Antimicrobial 
Patents Improve Global Public Health?, 7 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 559, 559 (2007) 
[hereinafter Longer Antimicrobial Patents]. 
25. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Kevin Outterson, Fighting Antibiotic Resistance: Marrying New 
Financial Incentives to Meeting Public Health Goals, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1689, 1692-94 (2010) 
[hereinafter, Fighting Antibiotic Resistance]; Outterson, supra note 19, at tbl.1 (outlining six 
possible policy sectors for addressing continued antibiotic effectiveness, using property, regulation 
and contract to improve antibiotic conservation and production). 
26. For examples of legal and health policy scholarship in Sectors 1-6, see Outterson, supra 
note 19, at 621-26. 
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TABLE 1: CONCEPTUAL LEGAL APPROACHES TO CONTINUED ANTIBIOTIC 
EFFECTIVENESS 
 Conservation Production 
Property 
  
Patents used as 
conservation tools to 
privately constrain 
demand. (Sector 1) 
Patents used as incentives to 
bring new antibiotics to market. 
(Sector 2) 
Regulation 
 
Public health infection 
control and antibiotic 
stewardship programs 
regulate demand for 
antibiotics. (Sector 3) 
FDA regulations relaxed to speed 
approval of new antibiotics. Tax 
subsidies support R&D. (Sector 
4) 
Contract Prizes, grants, and value-
based reimbursement 
support antibiotic 
conservation. (Sector 5) 
Prizes, grants, and value-based 
reimbursement support new 
antibiotic production. (Sector 6) 
Tort Patients sue for hospital-
associated infections, 
increasing institutional 
incentives to promote 
safety through antibiotic 
conservation. (Sector 7) 
Federal law designed to preempt 
state tort law, waiving drug 
company tort liability for 
antibiotics, similar to the national 
vaccine injury compensation 
program. (Sector 8) 
 This Article builds on our previous work by describing in-depth a range of 
integrated policy solutions that address the problem of antibiotic resistance. Our 
guiding premise is that society’s primary goal should be continued antibiotic 
effectiveness on a population level by giving proper incentives to various 
institutions and actors. We emphasize a balanced approach between production 
of new products and conservation of existing drugs, mirroring a similar shift that 
is currently underway in energy policy.  
Our approach departs from the conventional wisdom in several ways. Most 
dramatically, we focus economic incentives for conservation on the drug 
companies themselves, since we believe they are best positioned to act on 
superior information, if only their economic incentives were realigned. While 
supporting conservation incentives for providers and others, our primary 
contribution to the literature is to ensure that drug companies fully embrace 
antibiotic conservation. Secondly, we focus our efforts on Sectors 5 and 6 – 
voluntary contracts whereby governments reward patent owners for managing 
their resources for long-term public health. Our approach is novel in the legal 
literature. Legal scholarship on drug development has traditionally focused on 
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS XI:1 (2010) 
 
8 
 
property-based tools, especially the production of new drugs through patents 
(Sector 2).27 With the notable exceptions of work by Eric Kades28 and the 
“Extending the Cure” project by Ramanan Laxminarayan and Anup Malani,29 
legal scholarship has generally overlooked property-based conservation 
incentives designed to prolong antibiotic effectiveness for existing drugs, as well 
as other contract-based production incentives.30 Some authors have descriptively 
catalogued the application of tort law to infections, but without a larger 
theoretical framework that includes production incentives.31 Other legal scholars 
have described regulatory tools in Sectors 3 and 4, as well as cultural and 
professional influences on antibiotic prescribing practices.32 A recent article by 
William Sage and David Hyman takes a broader approach, cataloguing many 
possible regulatory strategies.33 The medical literature has often focused on 
Sector 3 conservation programs in isolation, without adequate analysis of the 
dynamic effects of multiple interventions and the legal and reimbursement 
environments. In the United States, most conservation and infection control 
studies focus on single hospitals, missing the positive externalities generated 
                                                       
27. See Outterson, supra note 19, at 620. 
28. See Eric Kades, supra note 19, at 643-53 (2005). 
29. LAXMINARAYAN ET AL., supra note 15. 
30. Outterson, supra note 19, at 622. In recent years, several scholars have discussed the 
potential for value-based reimbursement or pay-for-performance as an antidote for hospital-
associated infections. See, e.g., Rachel Deutsch, The Federal Role in Reducing Hospital-Acquired 
Conditions: Are Medicare Reimbursement Incentives Enough?, 42 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 1 
(2008); David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, You Get What You Pay For: Result-Based 
Compensation for Health Care, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1427 (2001) (briefly discussing 
nosocomial infections). 
31. Several authors have described tort-based approaches that would fit in Sector 7 (see Table 
1). See, e.g., Jennifer M. Miller, Liability Relating To Contracting Infectious Diseases in Hospitals, 
25 J. LEGAL MED. 211 (2004) (finding few effective tort remedies against hospitals and suggesting 
tort liability against health insurers as the better approach); Pamela Nolan, Unclean Hands: 
Holding Hospitals Responsible for Hospital-Acquired Infections, 34 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 
133 (2000); William M. Sage & David A. Hyman, Combating Antimicrobial Resistance: 
Regulatory Strategies and Institutional Capacity, 84 TUL. L. REV. 781 (2010); Robert Steinbach, 
Dirty Business: Legal Prophylaxis for Nosocomial Infections, 97 KY. L.J. 505 (2008) (describing 
the positive role tort law can have to promote hospital safety against acquired infections)and. For 
an example of a related Sector 8 approach, see Lincoln Mayer, Immunity for Immunizations: Tort 
Liability, Biodefense, and Bioshield II, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1753 (2007). 
32. Richard S. Saver, In Tepid Defense of Population Health: Physicians and Antibiotic 
Resistance, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 431 (2008).  
33. See Sage and Hyman, supra note 31, for a discussion on the regulatory institutions relating 
to antibiotic resistance. [OP: This needs a pincite.] 
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when multiple institutions cooperate across a region.34 Recent proposals to 
weaken antibiotic clinical trial requirements are Sector 4 initiatives.35 In short, 
legal and medical scholarship has not adequately focused on antibiotic issues in 
the remaining Sectors, especially contract law (5 and 6)36 and the complex 
interactions between conservation and production. 
To remedy this gap in the literature, we offer an overview of medical, legal, 
and market forces that affect antibiotic production and conservation. 
Furthermore, we present a novel cluster of integrated solutions, centered in 
contact law,37 which we call the Antibiotic Conservation and Effectiveness 
(ACE) program. The ACE program emphasizes: (1) value-based reimbursement 
of antibiotics from public payors such as Medicare and Medicaid, with spillover 
participation from private payors, in order to improve private markets for 
antibiotic effectiveness by providing financial incentives to promote continued 
antibiotic effectiveness; (2) making these payments conditional on meeting 
realistic public health and conservation goals, including a Strategic Antibiotic 
Reserve; (3) market-enhancing regulatory changes, including limited waivers of 
antitrust and other laws, to permit market coordination for conservation 
(supporting efforts in multiple Sectors); and (4) increased public grant support 
for basic antibiotic research, including both conservation and new production.  
The first element of the ACE program is value-based reimbursement for 
antibiotics, increasing the private value of these drugs to more closely resemble 
the social value. Changes in reimbursement can have a remarkable impact on 
how antibiotics are created and used. For too long, antibiotics have been seen as 
cheap drugs, when in fact they are valuable exhaustible goods.38 Improved 
                                                       
34. See Outterson, supra note 18. 
35. BAD BUGS, supra note 9; Cecilia H. Burke & Geoffrey M. Levitt, A Manufacturer’s 
Perspective: Recent Challenges in Antibiotic Drug Approval, 2 UPDATE: FOOD & DRUG L. REG. & 
ED. 12 (2008); Steven J. Projan & David M. Shlaes, Antibacterial Drug Discovery: Is It All 
Downhill From Here?, 4 CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY & INFECTION. 18 (2004). 
36. But see Sage & Hyman, supra note 33, at 799-803 (discussing improvements to 
information and public reporting of nosocomial infections). Tort law (Sectors 7 and 8) are 
discussed in a draft manuscript. See Outterson, supra note 18. 
37. We treat health insurance reimbursement as a form of contract law, even though the 
market includes some elements of monopolies and monopsonies, as well as significant government 
regulation. Similarly, we treat grants as contracts, voluntarily entered into by the parties. Issues of 
tort law will be saved for another day.  
38. Recently, antibiotics have been featured prominently in low-cost generic drug dispensation 
programs by many national retail pharmacies. For example, Wal-Mart’s low-cost program allows 
patients to buy twelve different varieties of the antibiotic amoxicillin for $4 per month. See Wal-
Mart $4 Medication List, http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/health/drugs/walmart-
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systems of reimbursement can support usage patterns more in tune with the 
intrinsic value of these drugs, as well as support the rational development of new 
ones. Our proposal includes prizes to promote antibiotic innovation as a form of 
reimbursement. James Love has posited prizes and reimbursement as conflicting 
choices for antibiotic innovation,39 but we tend to see them as complementary, so 
long as prices at the point of care do not increase. In our proposal, the price paid 
by patients is not directly affected by value-based reimbursement. We focus on 
how the patent holders are reimbursed by private and public health plans. One 
mechanism might be a voluntary contract between the federal government and 
the patent holder, promising a significant financial prize in line with the public 
health impact of the drug, akin to James Love and Tim Hubbard’s extensive 
proposals for drug R&D prizes40 or Thomas Pogge and Aiden Hollis’ Health 
Impact Fund.41  
The second element of the ACE program makes these payments conditional: 
                                                                                                                                       
druglist.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2010). While such generic drug programs have been rightly 
extolled for helping promote access and adherence to essential medicines, low-cost antibiotic 
access has been linked to overuse of these drug, particularly in lower-income settings. Beatriz 
Espinosa Franco et al., The Determinants of the Antibiotic Resistance Process, 2 INFECTIOUS DRUG 
RESISTANCE 1 (2009); see also Karen Caffarini, Antibiotic Giveaways Stoke Fear of Patient 
Pressure, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 29, 2009, http://www.ama-assn.org/ 
amednews/2009/01/26/bisc0128.htm. For a recent empirical analysis finding increased antibiotic 
consumption with free programs, see Shanjun Li & Ramanan Laxminarayan, Are Physicians’ 
Prescribing Decisions Sensitive to Drug Prices? Evidence from a Free-Antibiotics Program (May 1, 
2010) (working paper, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1598804).  
39. James Love, Prizes, Not Prices, To Stimulate Antibiotic R&D, SCI. & DEV. NETWORK, Mar. 
26, 2008,  http://www.scidev.net/en/opinions/prizes‐not‐prices-to-stimulate-antibiotic-r-d‐.html. 
40. James Love & Tim Hubbard, The Big Idea: Prizes To Stimulate R&D for New Medicines, 
82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1519 (2007); James Love & Tim Hubbard, Prizes for Innovation of New 
Medicines and Vaccines, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 155 (2009); see also LAXMINARAYAN ET AL., supra 
note 15; MOSSIALOS ET AL., supra note 14; SWEDISH PRESIDENCY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra 
note 16; Amy Kapczynski, Innovation Policy for a New Era, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 264 (2009) 
(suggesting prizes for antibiotic development); Kesselheim & Outterson, supra note 25. But see 
Donald W. Light, Making Practical Markets for Vaccines, 2 PLOS MED. e271 (2005), available at 
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/submissions/CGD-PLOS-Light-10%1371_journal%pmed 
%200020271‐p‐L.pdf (arguing against advanced market commitments in vaccine R&D). 41.  AIDAN  HOLLIS  &  THOMAS  POGGE,  THE  HEALTH  IMPACT  FUND:  MAKING  NEW  MEDICINES ACCESSIBLE  FOR  ALL (2008); Thomas Pogge, Human Rights and Global Health: A Research 
Program, 36 METAPHILOSOPHY 182 (2005); Aidan Hollis, An Efficient Reward System for 
Pharmaceutical Innovation (Jan. 17, 2005) (working paper, available at http://econ.ucalgary.ca/fac-
files/ah/drugprizes.pdf). 
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sponsors obtain enhanced financial rewards only if antibiotic conservation targets 
are met. With this condition in place, a financial incentive would be created for 
the first time to manage antibiotics for public health rather than just private gain. 
This second element is necessarily linked to the first: absent this conditionality, 
increased reimbursement for antibiotics would simply accelerate the patent 
holder’s incentives to aggressively sell the drugs. Taken together, our goal is to 
pay more for fewer pills consumed. For a simplified example, if a company 
currently sells one-hundred million antibiotic pills for $1 each, their total revenue 
is $100 million. Under ACE, assume that actual clinical needs with conservation 
are only fifty million pills. At this point, the company has lost $50 million in 
decreased unit sales. But if the company meets the conservation targets, an ACE 
prize of perhaps $150 million will be paid—essentially quadrupling the unit price 
while halving the unit sales. The companies will profit significantly by achieving 
public health goals. 
This conditionality also offers interesting opportunities for special prizes for 
a few particularly valuable antibiotics. For example, the United States could 
create a Strategic Antibiotic Reserve to reward the conservation of important 
antibiotics. Under the present patent-based system, companies turn a profit only 
if they sell vast quantities of an antibiotic. For drugs in the Strategic Antibiotic 
Reserve, companies would be rewarded today for not selling the antibiotic, 
preserving a precious resource for dire future needs.42 
Third, the biology of resistance creates unique horizontal and vertical 
coordination problems, even with perfect information and improved incentives at 
the individual company level. Overuse of antibiotics can create resistance to 
other drugs in their class. If multiple drug companies hold the patents for these 
drugs, the companies will need to coordinate some of their market activities for 
long-term sustainability. For these horizontal coordination activities, limited 
antitrust waivers will permit efficient market coordination, without some of the 
monopolistic concerns ordinarily addressed by antitrust law. Limited waivers in 
other aspects of the law, such as the Stark anti-self-referral legislation, may be 
required to permit vertical coordination with hospitals, physicians, and other 
providers in implementing infection control measures.  
                                                       
42. We articulate the Strategic Antibiotic Reserve separately because the unit sales might be 
extremely low in the first decade after introduction, swamping the insurance reimbursement system 
with pills with an imputed unit cost in the millions of dollars. In this case, a direct payment 
mechanism is indicated. The concept of compensating developers for better managing their public 
good products has a long history in American markets, particularly in agriculture. See, e.g., 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-10, 41 Stat. 31 (1933) (seeking to decrease 
supplies of crops during the New Deal era by paying farmers to produce less). 
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Finally, public funding through the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and 
other agencies is necessary because for-profit companies do not invest in certain 
types of research that are essential for public health, including investments in 
human infrastructure to build research capacities in infectious diseases. 
This Article proceeds in six sections. Section I briefly reviews the medical 
literature on antibacterial resistance. Section II examines the current state of 
antibiotic research and development. Section III reviews existing legal paradigms 
for creating and managing antibiotics. Section IV presents our core proposals, the 
Antibiotic Conservation and Effectiveness (ACE) program. In Section V, we take 
up critiques of ACE incentives, including the difficulties in fine-tuning financial 
and reimbursement incentives and the increased investment necessary to make 
ACE a reality. One key to this proposal is that the patent system remains 
unchanged; any alternatives offered are contractual and voluntary at the 
discretion of the companies. We then offer our conclusions in Section VI. The 
ACE program is designed to improve antibiotic markets, using government 
contracts to create a long-term and sustainable balance between the supply and 
demand for antibiotics. The ACE program will better align private and social 
values in this important sector. Otherwise, we cannot be certain that effective 
antibiotics will be available when infections strike. 
I. ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE  
The first commercial use of penicillin in the 1940s signaled the birth of the 
antibiotic era.43 Despite the efficacy of these new antibiotics, the medical 
community observed the emergence and spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria 
within a few years of the introduction of penicillin.44 Microorganisms have been 
found to exhibit a number of biological adaptations, including natural selection of 
new mutations and the passage of elements carrying resistance genes between 
species.45 Resistant microorganisms pass readily among people, and even more 
readily among the sickest people in hospitals or other health care delivery 
institutions.46 Antibiotic use can also spur infection by clearing commensal 
                                                       
43. Charles M. Grossman, The First Use of Penicillin in the United States, 149 ANNALS 
INTERNAL MED. 135 (2008). 
44. See Mary Barber, Staphylococcal Infection Due to Penicillin-Resistant Strains, 2 BMJ 
863, 864 (1947) (noting that the first report of penicillin-resistant staphylococcal infections came 
shortly after the widespread use of penicillin). 
45. See generally Marc Lipsitch & Matthew H. Samore, Antimicrobial Use and Antimicrobial 
Resistance: A Population Perspective, 8 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 347 (2002). 
46. See J. Kristie Johnson et al., The Role of Patient-to-Patient Transmission in the Acquisition 
of Imipenem-Resistant Pseudomonas Aeruginosa Colonization in the Intensive Care Unit, 200 J. 
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species that serve as natural limits on the overgrowth of deadly bacteria such as 
Clostridium difficile.47  
Over the past decades, however, we have learned that the way antibiotics are 
used facilitates the development and spread of resistance.48 Sir Alexander 
Fleming, who shared the Nobel Prize for the discovery of penicillin, first noted 
the role that antibiotic misuse plays in resistance, reporting, “It is not difficult to 
make microbes resistant to penicillin in the laboratory by exposing them to 
concentrations not sufficient to kill them.”49 Misuse of antibiotics occurs in a 
number of ways, including prescription of antibiotics when they are not needed, 
prescription of the wrong type of antibiotic, and improper use of antibiotics by 
patients. All of these factors have direct biological ramifications; one model is 
that as the most susceptible bacteria are killed, microbes that may have 
developed resistance mutations can flourish in an environment with fewer 
competitors.50  
There is a large literature on factors contributing to the social misuse of 
antibiotics.51 One driver is physicians’ prescribing practices. Studies show that 
physicians vary broadly in their antibiotic prescription practices,52 and may not 
be aware of or adhere to clinical practice guidelines addressing proper use of 
antibiotic agents.53 For example, studies have shown that generalists and 
infectious disease specialists were more likely to prefer newer, broader-spectrum 
drugs for the treatment of community-acquired pneumonia compared to older, 
                                                                                                                                       
INFECTIOUS DISEASE 900 (2009). 
47. See Outterson, supra note 18,,for a full discussion of the pathogenesis of Clostridium 
difficile. 
48. See generally Saver, supra note 32. 
49. A. Mark Joffe, Desperate Therapies and the Amazing Race for Antimicrobial Alternatives, 
17 CAN. J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES MED. & MICROBIOLOGY 285 (2006) (quoting Sir Alexander 
Fleming, Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech, 1945). 
50. See Lipsitch & Samore, supra note 45, at 349.  
51. See, e.g., McDonnell Norms Group, Antibiotic Overuse: The Influence of Social Norms, 
207 J. AM. C. SURGEONS 265 (2008). This is true of both pediatric and adult patients. See, e.g., 
Howard Bauchner et al., Parents, Physicians, and Antibiotic Use, 103 PEDIATRICS 395 (1999); see 
also John Macfarlane et al., Influence of Patients’ Expectations on Antibiotic Management of Acute 
Lower Respiratory Tract Illness in General Practice: Questionnaire Study, 315 BMJ 1211 (1997). 
52. Ethan A. Halm et al., What Factors Influence Physicians’ Decisions to Switch from 
Intravenous to Oral Antibiotics for Community-Acquired Pneumonia?, 16 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 
599 (2001). 
53. Galen E. Switzer et al., Physician Awareness and Self-Reported Use of Local and National 
Guidelines for Community-Acquired Pneumonia, 18 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 816 (2003). 
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more narrowly tailored agents still recommended by national guidelines.54 Use of 
broad-spectrum antibiotic agents in patients whose infections are susceptible to a 
narrower-spectrum product can promote resistance and ultimately impede 
management if a more severe multidrug-resistant infection develops that requires 
the broad-spectrum agent.55 
Patient behavior also contributes substantially to the development of 
antibiotic resistance. Patients may demand antibiotic agents in inappropriate 
clinical situations.56 Patient demand for antibiotics in the setting of viral or non-
infectious diseases can promote resistance, as studies have shown that 
prescription of multiple courses of the same antibiotic selects for more resistant 
organisms57 and clears ecological space for transmission and growth of resistant 
pathogens.58 Yet patient demand is a leading predictor of whether physicians 
provide an antibiotic prescription.59 In addition, studies have shown that patients 
are insufficiently aware of the important ramifications of antibiotic overuse in the 
development of resistance.60 Patients also may not always adhere to full 
treatment lengths,61 which might be better if the prescription was inappropriate in 
the first instance. For some infections with particularly dangerous public health 
implications, such as multidrug-resistant tuberculosis, directly observed therapy 
(DOT) programs have been employed to ensure patient adherence to a full course 
of treatment.62 
                                                       
54. See, e.g., Joel Lexchin, Promoting Resistance?, 28/29 ESSENTIAL DRUGS MONITOR 11 
(2000); Joshua P. Metlay et al., Tensions in Antibiotic Prescribing: Pitting Social Concerns Against 
the Interests of Individual Patients, 17 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 87 (2002). 
55. Carlos G. Grijalva et al., Antibiotic Prescription Rates for Acute Respiratory Tract 
Infections in US Ambulatory Settings, 302 JAMA 758 (2009). 
56. Samuel Coenen et al., Antibiotic Prescribing for Acute Cough: The Effect of Perceived 
Patient Demand, 56 BRIT. J. GEN. PRAC. 183 (2006). 
57. Céire Costelloe et al., Effect of Antibiotic Prescribing in Primary Care on Antimicrobial 
Resistance in Individual Patients: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 340 BMJ c2096 (2010).  
58. See Phillip Toltzis et al., Impact of Amoxicillin on Pneumococcal Colonization Compared 
with Other Therapies for Acute Otitis Media, 24 PEDIATRIC INFECTIOUS DISEASE J. 24 (2005). 
59. See Coenen et al., supra note 56. 
60. See Jodi Vanden Eng et al., Consumer Attitudes and Use of Antibiotics, 9 EMERGING 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1128 (2003); see also Edward A. Belongia et al., Antibiotic Use and Upper 
Respiratory Infections: A Survey of Knowledge, Attitudes, and Experience in Wisconsin and 
Minnesota, 34 PREVENTATIVE MED. 346 (2002). 
61. See Diana I. Brixner, Improving Acute Otitis Media Outcomes Through Proper Antibiotic 
Use and Adherence, 11 AM. J. MANAGED CARE S202 (2005). 
62. A. M. Nyamathi et al., A Randomized Controlled Trial of Two Treatment Programs for 
Homeless Adults with Latent Tuberculosis Infection, 10 INT’L J. TUBERCULOSIS & LUNG DISEASE 
775 (2006).  
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External social pressures also contribute to antibiotic overuse and resistance. 
Direct-to-physician advertising of antibiotics is one such factor. One study of 
advertisements related to antibiotics in medical journals showed that these 
advertisements, in promoting use of their products, rarely mentioned the risk of 
antibiotic resistance.63 The power of such advertising to affect physician-
prescribing practices is well documented and will be discussed in more detail in 
Section IV below. The example of free antibiotic programs combines elements of 
physician, patient and social pressures to prescribe. As Li and Laxminarayan 
have recently shown, free antibiotic programs at large U.S. pharmacies, such as 
Wal-Mart, influence physician prescribing patterns in statistically significant 
ways.64 These market forces are barriers to optimal antibiotic use, but are also 
important potential levers for the proposed ACE Program. If drug companies 
were properly incentivized for public health goals, their influence and financial 
resources could be deployed to counteract many of the clinically inappropriate 
uses described above. At the very least, the companies would no longer have 
strong financial incentives to oppose public health conservation measures. 
II. THE LIMITATIONS OF NEW ANTIBIOTIC DEVELOPMENT 
In recent years, infectious disease experts have expressed concern over the 
diminishing pipeline of additional antibiotics available to manage resistant 
disease.65 In this Section, we examine the evidence and conclude that new 
production alone is unlikely to meet clinical needs unless a strong emphasis is 
also placed on antibiotic conservation. 
The Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA) has described a 
consistent decline in the total number of new antibacterial agents approved in the 
last twenty-five years, and has reported that since 2004, only five systemic agents 
were actively being developed by the largest pharmaceutical companies.66 This is 
                                                       
63. Jacob Gilad et al., Antibiotic Drug Advertising in Medical Journals, 37 SCANDINAVIAN J. 
INFECTIOUS DISEASE 910 (2005).  
64. Shanjun  Li  &  Ramanan  Laxminarayan,  Are  Physicians’  Prescribing  Decisions Sensitive to Drug Prices? Evidence from a Free‐Antibiotics Program (May 1, 2010) (working 
paper, available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1598804); see also 
Caffarini, supra note 38; Franco et al., supra note 38, at 1.  
65. See, e.g., BAD BUGS, supra note 9; Brad Spellberg et al., Trends in Antimicrobial Drug 
Development: Implications for the Future, 38 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1279 (2004).  
66. David M. Livermore, Has the Era of Untreatable Infections Arrived?, 64 J. 
ANTIMICROBIAL CHEMOTHERAPY i29 (Supp. 1, 2009) (noting that we may have exhausted all 
therapeutic options); Brad Spellberg et al., The Epidemic of Antibiotic-Resistant Infections: A Call 
to Action for the Medical Community from the Infectious Diseases Society of America, 46 CLINICAL 
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partially a secular trend, as FDA approvals in general have declined in recent 
years as well, as shown in Figure 1. Part of the problem lies with drug innovation 
in general, not antibiotics in particular. 
FIGURE 1: NUMBER OF ANTIBACTERIAL (AB) AND ALL OTHER NEW 
MOLECULAR ENTITIES (NMES) APPROVED BY THE FDA, BY YEAR OF 
APPROVAL67 
 
According to the European Society of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious 
Diseases (ESCMID), the oxazolidinone class of antibiotics, which includes 
linezolid (Zyvox), is the only class with a completely novel mode of action that 
has been developed in the past three decades.68 This claim, however, depends on 
                                                                                                                                       
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 155, 158 (2008). But see Julian Davies, The Garden of Antimicrobial 
Delights, 2 F1000 BIOLOGY REPORTS 26 (2010) (suggesting that additional antibiotic development 
should not be too difficult).  
67. Rosa Rodriguez-Monguio, Enrique Seoane-Vasquez, John H, Powers, and Kevin 
Outterson, Analysis of Systemic Antibiotics Approved in the U.S. Between 1980 and 2009 (2010) 
(abstract for 138th APHA Annual Meeting, on file with author).  
68. Ragnar S. Norrby et al., Lack of Development of New Antimicrobial Drugs: A Potential 
Serious Threat to Public Health, 5 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 115, 116 (2005). Linezolid is the 
first member of the oxazolidinone family to be marketed in the United States.  
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how the term “class” is defined and the time period selected for comparison.69 
Since 2000, two new antibiotic classes (analogues of classes)70—ketolides71 and 
glycylcyclines72—have been approved that comprise important variations on old 
classes with improvements in their activity against resistant organisms. The FDA 
has also approved daptomycin (Cubicin) and quinupristin/dalfopristin (Synercid) 
in the last decade. Both of these products feature relatively novel mechanisms of 
action and could be considered new classes in humans, although prior animal use 
of virginiamycin has potentially affected quinupristin/dalfopristin. Several 
researchers have suggested that the proper category is not chemical class, but 
“functional resistance groups,” drugs for which certain species exhibit patterns of 
cross-resistance.73 On that basis, the FDA has approved 2-5 new functional 
resistance groups in the past decade, depending on whether a narrow or 
expansive definition is used. 
A more clinical way to view the success of antibiotic development may be to 
look at whether we are able to treat patients fighting serious resistant infections. 
From that perspective, current treatments are improving against some pathogens 
but worsening against others.74 An IDSA task force surveyed the literature and 
identified six particularly dangerous groups of microorganisms displaying 
increasing resistance rates that pose important threats to patient care: extended-
spectrum beta-lactamase (ESBL)-producing Enterobacteriaceae, methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus 
faecium (VRE), Acinetobacter baumanii, Pseudomonas aeruginosa, and 
                                                       
69. Longer Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 24. 
70. Many independent industry experts would not consider ketolides and glycylcyclines as 
new classes, but as “analogues of existing classes.” Interview with Ursula Theuretzbacher, 
Founder, Ctr. for Anti-Infective Agents (July 27, 2010) (on file with Kevin Outterson). 
71. Telithromycin (Ketek) is a novel derivative of the class of macrolide antibiotics that was 
designed with side-chain modifications intended to overcome antibiotic resistance to other 
macrolides. Kimberly D. Clay et al., Severe Hepatotoxicity of Telithromycin: Three Case Reports 
and Literature Review, 142 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 415 (2006). Notably, telithromycin was not 
demonstrated to be more effective than other antibiotics in treating the infectious diseases for which 
it was indicated. It is also currently available only in oral form, which limits its utility in the sickest 
of patients with multidrug resistant infections.  
72. Tigecycline (Tygacil) is derivative of the class of tetracyclines with microbiological 
activity against intra-abdominal and skin and soft tissue infections caused by susceptible or 
multidrug-resistant staphylococci, enterococci, or streptococci as well as most Enterobacteriaceae 
and anaerobic pathogens. Ethan Rubinstein & David Vaughan, Tigecycline: A Novel Glycylcycline, 
65 DRUGS 1317 (2005). 
73. LAXMINARAYAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 20, 40-41; MOSSIALOS, supra note 14, at 7, 113.  
74. Livermore, supra note 66. 
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Aspergillus.75 The IDSA concluded that among these six priority groups of 
pathogens, MRSA has the largest current clinical impact and also the largest 
market for drugs.76 Not surprisingly, a number of potentially useful MRSA drugs 
are in late-stage development.77 The other five priority pathogens with smaller 
potential markets have fewer new agents in the pipeline,78 which is not 
unexpected given market incentives. 
The primary reason that pipelines for some priority pathogens can be so 
small is that for-profit companies with very high revenue expectations have 
dominated pharmaceutical research and development (R&D). The average 
funding for pharmaceutical R&D by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) has 
risen more slowly over time79 as compared to pharmaceutical manufacturers.80 
More significantly, for-profit companies control approximately 90% of drug-
related patents,81 which often cover underlying research performed in academic 
institutions supported by public funds.82 Though these companies have 
contributed to important progress in development of new medical treatments,83 
they also are beholden to their shareholders. Data from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and the Department of Health and Human Services in the 
late 1990s suggest that the largest pharmaceutical manufacturers invest about 
one-third of their revenues in sales and general administration (including 
advertising), another 20% in return to shareholders, and about 15% in R&D in 
200084 (industry estimates report 17% in 2009).85 More recent data suggest that 
                                                       
75. George H. Talbot et al., Bad Bugs Need Drugs: An Update on the Development Pipeline 
from the Antimicrobial Availability Task Force of the Infectious Diseases Society of America, 42 
CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 657, 657 (2006). 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. See NAT’L SCI. FOUND., FEDERAL FUNDS FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: FISCAL YEARS 
2007-09 (2010), available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf10305. 
80. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
(2006), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7615/10-02-DrugR-D.pdf. 
81. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, Using Patent Data To Assess the Value of 
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 176, 179 (2009). 
82. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, University-Based Science and Biotechnology 
Products: Defining the Boundaries of Intellectual Property, 293 JAMA 850 (2005). 
83. JOHN L. LAMATTINA, DRUG TRUTHS: DISPELLING THE MYTH ABOUT PHARMA R&D (Wiley 
2008). 
84. FAMILIES USA, OFF THE CHARTS: PAY, PROFITS AND SPENDING BY DRUG COMPANIES 
(2001), available at www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/offthecharts6475.pdf; KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND., PRESCRIPTION DRUG TRENDS: A CHARTBOOK 65, 70 fig. 4.5, 71 fig. 4.6 (2000), available at 
http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/3019-index.cfm; Press Release, Public Citizen’s Congress Watch, Drug 
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pharmaceutical manufacturers still spend 31%-50% of sales on marketing.86 
While industry supporters offer slightly different numbers,87 the essential point is 
clear: increased sales of pharmaceuticals translate into only a limited increase in 
R&D after accounting for other expenses and R&D costs bear little relationship 
to prices. As Professor Scherer notes: “Sunk research-and-development costs are 
bygones and are therefore irrelevant in current pricing decisions.”88  
As a result, projected revenue, rather than other factors such as morbidity of 
a disease or perceived public health need, can become the most important 
determinant of new drug development.89 Antibiotics face unique reimbursement 
challenges in part because of their history of low unit prices, but also because the 
total unit sales may be smaller than other drug markets.90 From a financial point 
of view, drug companies often disparage antibiotics as poor sellers due to the 
                                                                                                                                       
Industry Most Profitable Again (April 11, 2001), available at http://www.citizen.org/ 
pressroom/release.cfm?ID=819 (noting that in 2000 Fortune 500 drug companies devoted 30%of 
revenues to marketing and administration and 12% to R&D). 
85. PHARM. RESEARCH AND MFRS. OF AM., PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFILE 2009 (2009), 
available at http://www.phrma.org/files/attachments/PhRMA%202009%20Profile%20FINAL.pdf 
(citing 17.4% of total sales into R&D).  
86. Marc-André Gagnon & Joel Lexchin, The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New Estimate of 
Pharmaceutical Promotion Expenditures in the United States, 5 PLoS MED. 29, 32 (2008), 
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pm.ed.0050001. (finding 
that the actual amount of promotional expenditures “could range from a low of US$27.7 billion to a 
high of US$57.5 billion”). 
87. See R&D Investment by US Biopharma Remains Strong Despite Ongoing Economic 
Challenges, Reaching a Record $65.3 Billion, THE PHARMA NEWS, Mar. 17, 2010, available at 
http://www.phrma.org/news/news/rd_investment_us_biopharmaceutical_companies_remains_stron
g_despite_ongoing_economic_chall (reporting that the pharmaceutical industry trade group 
estimates that “the USA’s pharmaceutical research companies have consistently invested around 
18% of domestic sales on R&D activities”). 
88. F.M. Scherer, The Pharmaceutical Industry – Prices and Progress, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
927, 929 (2004). 
89. As Roin has pointed out, this perspective has a substantial effect on decisions regarding 
whether to continue to invest in “pipeline” drugs. Companies have preferentially invested in 
research on products whose intellectual property ownership is clear (or solidly under their control), 
excluding research on other approaches or agents that could be better suited to address unmet 
public health needs. Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 
TEX. L. REV. 503 (2009). But see Kevin Outterson, Death from the Public Domain?, 87 TEXAS L. 
REV. SEE ALSO 45 (2009), http://www.texaslrev.com/seealso/volume-87/roin/death-from-the-
public-domain.html (challenging the example of an unpatentable drug given by Roin). 
90. Richard P. Wenzel, The Antibiotic Pipeline—Challenges, Costs, and Values, 351 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 523 (2004).  
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short courses of therapy, which limit the ability to earn revenues over a long 
period of time.91 “Blockbuster” drugs are usually defined as those producing 
revenues in excess of a billion dollars per year,92 but in antibiotics, companies 
would consider $200 million in annual sales to be a successful market.93 And 
while some large pharmaceutical companies are moving away from the 
blockbuster drug development model,94 many manufacturers still focus on 
diseases that may provide a higher return on investment.95 Even when drug 
companies decide to invest in R&D for antibiotics, they are drawn to the largest 
markets, such as the multibillion-dollar MRSA market. Large multinational drug 
companies have not deeply invested in finding drugs for the other five priority 
pathogens identified by the IDSA.96 The ACE program redirects company R&D 
incentives by instituting value-based reimbursement. Companies will be paid for 
the health impact of their antibiotic, not the historically low prices prevalent 
today. 
Other peculiar factors also may disincentivize investment in new antibiotic 
development by for-profit companies. Increasing resistance makes the antibiotic 
less effective over time, which might limit the ability of pharmaceutical 
manufacturers to use standard “life-cycle management” strategies, such as the 
creation of variant dose or extended-release formulations.97 Existing evidence 
                                                       
91. Roger Finch & Pamela A. Hunter, Antibiotic Resistance—Action To Promote New 
Technologies: Report of an EU Intergovernmental Conference Held in Birmingham, UK, 12-13 
December 2005, 58 J. ANTIMICROBIAL CHEMOTHERAPY, i3, 17 (2006). 
92. Bruce Booth & Rodney Zemmel, Quest for the Best, 2 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY. 
838, 838 (2003). 
93. Interview with Ursula Theuretzbacher, Founder, Ctr. for Anti-Infective Agents (July 27, 
2010) (on file with Kevin Outterson). 
94. See David M. Cutler, The Demise of the Blockbuster?, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1292 
(2007); see also Matthew Goodman, New Boss Andrew Witty Revamps GlaxoSmithKline, THE 
TIMES, Jul. 27, 2008, 
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/industrials/article4405862.ece. 
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suggests that commercially significant resistance does not occur during the patent 
term, so this effect may be modest.98  
The market for new antibiotic products in the United States and other 
wealthy countries is limited by public health efforts to prevent infections and 
restrict the prescription of antibiotics in order to prevent the acceleration of 
bacterial resistance.99 Pharmaceutical companies are concerned that important 
new antibiotic drugs may be subject to aggressive restrictions on use, price 
controls, and copying by unlicensed generic manufacturers in developing 
countries.100 These programs may greatly improve public health, but they reduce 
the demand for antibiotics and thus shrink the market for the companies that sell 
them. Antibiotic conservation directly threatens the commercial market for new 
antibiotics.101 Similarly, the production of multiple new antibiotics promoted by 
for-profit companies directly threatens conservation. The ACE program directly 
addresses this problem by reimbursing for conservation.  
Finally, drug companies sometimes claim that antibiotics face uniquely 
higher research costs that discourage development.102 For example, critics claim 
that FDA regulatory requirements have been overly burdensome in the field of 
infectious diseases, where placebo-controlled studies can be infeasible and 
alternative study designs, such as non-inferiority studies, can be challenging and 
costly to organize.103 While these claims about clinical study designs are 
plausible, they are not universally accepted.104 Antibiotic clinical trials are often 
less expensive than many other types of drug trials because many “predictive 
animal models [are] available and the late attrition rate due to ineffectiveness is 
low for antibiotics.”105 In addition, speeding up antibiotic approvals may increase 
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the risk that antibiotics reach the market with unknown safety risks.106 In the past 
three decades, drug companies have withdrawn numerous antibiotics with safety 
concerns from the U.S. market, more than any other drug class.107 This is not a 
record that supports a call for weaker safety standards. Enhanced conservation 
under ACE will diminish the urge to rush antibiotics through trials prematurely. 
In recent years, many groups have suggested proposals to address the 
problem of serious disease from resistant pathogens.108 Some proposals focus on 
reducing demand for antibiotics, for example, through conservation, appropriate 
use, antibiotic stewardship and infection control (see Sector 3 in Table 1).109 
Others focus on the supply side (Sectors 2, 4 and 6), generally suggesting 
additional property rights or financial incentives to encourage for-profit 
pharmaceutical industry investment in new drug development.110 The better 
discussions, in our view, integrate both conservation and production into a 
coherent policy analysis.111 In the next Part, we analyze the most prominent 
conservation and production proposals and consider how they align financial 
incentives with public health goals. Our proposals borrow from many existing 
ideas, but integrate them simultaneously to address both conservation and 
production. 
III. EXISTING PARADIGMS TO PROMOTE CONTINUED ANTIBIOTIC EFFECTIVENESS 
Proposals to address the growing problem with resistant microorganisms 
have emerged from a number of different perspectives. In many cases, these 
proposals come from different academic disciplines, often operating 
independently of each other. Patent lawyers suggest patent extensions; 
epidemiologists suggest infection control; clinicians demand new antibiotics; 
drug companies want to maximize revenue; and regulators suggest new 
regulations. These disciplines must break their isolation and integrate their 
perspectives into a comprehensive solution. 
First, many researchers have emphasized conservation of currently available 
antibiotics through strategies such as infection control, as well as limitations on 
the use of antibiotics to clinically appropriate situations. One institutional 
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champion of this Sector 3 (see Table 1) approach is the Alliance for the Prudent 
Use of Antibiotics (APUA). Other strategies focus on developing new drugs 
rather than conservation of existing ones. For example, the IDSA has 
prominently aligned itself with a call for new financial incentives to support the 
development of new antibiotic pharmaceutical products. These Sector 2 
proposals include additional patent-based exclusivity for sponsors.112 Some 
academics and think tanks have suggested non-patent-based incentive proposals, 
including guaranteed purchase contracts or cash prizes113 for successful 
development of a new antibiotic.114 These are Sector 6 proposals, focused on 
contract rather than property rights. The IDSA and others have proposed 
reducing costs of antibiotic research and development (Sector 4), which can 
include changing regulatory parameters that guide new drug approval.115 IDSA 
has also supported increasing government grants to build the infrastructure and 
help promote better understanding of basic biology and drug targets (Sector 6).116 
Tort law could also be used, either as a liability threat to promote conservation 
(Sector 7) or as a shield to promote production of new drugs by preempting state 
tort law (Sector 8). We will first examine the major existing efforts before we 
turn to our novel proposals. 
A. Antibiotic Conservation  
Environmental infection control117 and programs designed to promote 
rational use of antibiotics (also called “antibiotic stewardship”)118 are the primary 
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mechanisms through which antibiotic conservation is currently implemented.119 
Infection control is a public health measure that can help slow the spread of all 
infections, including particularly virulent or resistant microbes.120 Examples of 
infection control mechanisms include tuberculosis testing for healthcare 
professionals,121 environmental cleaning,122 screening of high-risk patients for 
resistant microbes,123 and isolating high-risk patients in special rooms or 
wards.124 
Antibiotic stewardship can involve physician education or active 
management of physicians’ prescription of antibiotics to encourage the 
appropriate selection, dosing, route, and duration of therapy.125 The goal is to 
optimize clinical outcomes while minimizing unintended consequences of 
antibiotic use like the emergence of resistance.126 Academic detailing programs127 
and antibiotic prescription guidelines128 teach physicians about evidence-based 
prescribing without formal restrictions on their prescribing behaviors. Active 
management of prescription choices is usually a top-down process organized at 
the level of the payor or practice organization. The most interventionist programs 
involve formal restrictions on prescribing and can exclude certain antibiotics 
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from clinical use.129 Other less restrictive types of active management include 
requiring heightened justification from physicians before prescribing certain 
antibiotics. Prior authorization requirements, for example, have been shown to 
change prescribing patterns in other drug classes.130 
Some stewardship tactics, particularly formulary restriction and 
preauthorization requirements, have demonstrated ability to affect antibiotic 
resistance rates; one study found that six months after restricting prescribing of 
vancomycin, colonization by vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus (VRE) 
decreased from 47% to 15% in one hospital.131 Stewardship programs can also be 
cost-effective for hospitals132 and health care systems.133 
Despite these successes, studies have also shown that stewardship programs 
are not fully effective against the emergence of antibiotic resistance.134 Recent 
systematic reviews concluded that inpatient stewardship programs can reduce 
antibacterial resistance,135 but that similar outcomes are much harder to achieve 
in the outpatient realm.136 MRSA has been documented to circumvent patient 
isolation in different rooms or across separated cohort bays.137 Other stewardship 
programs, such as educational tools aimed at teaching proper antibiotic use to 
physicians and disseminating expert-developed clinical guidelines, have varied 
effects on prescribing practices and have not been shown to have a substantial 
impact on development of resistance.138 Formulary restrictions on certain 
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antibiotics have led to over-prescription and increased resistance to other non-
restricted antibiotics.139 Finally, some studies have shown that even rigorous 
antibiotic restriction practices that result in short-term improvements and slower 
overall rates of resistance growth have not fully deterred antibiotic resistance.140 
Conservation buys more time, but is only a partial solution. 
The scientific literature on stewardship programs thus suggests that certain 
sensible and well-coordinated programs can be effective against antimicrobial 
resistance. However, social factors related to the pharmaceutical and health 
delivery markets have limited the implementation of effective stewardship and 
infection control strategies. In particular, we have identified two primary ways 
that the financial incentives of important actors in this market are misaligned.  
First, formulary restrictions and preauthorization requirements can be 
effective stewardship tools, but pharmaceutical manufacturers generally disfavor 
such measures since they dampen demand for their products. These managed-
care techniques restrict access to their products through tiered formularies or as 
part of step therapy.141 The industry has fought these restrictions in many ways, 
including litigation in the highest courts.142 Since pharmaceutical companies are 
such powerful institutional actors, any public health program that faces strident 
drug company opposition will have difficulty succeeding. Our ACE proposals are 
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designed to align private financial incentives with public health goals in a way 
that makes the drug companies full partners in antibiotic conservation efforts.  
Second, hospitals and physicians do not have a billing code for conservation. 
The lack of both direct reimbursement for infection control and upfront resources 
to implement stewardship measures effectively have limited infection control 
measures at hospitals and ambulatory surgical centers.143 Budgets for infection 
control continue to tighten—according to recent Medicare guidelines, hospitals 
will not be reimbursed for the additional costs of treating inpatients who develop 
urinary or vascular catheter-associated infections, whether or not the infection 
was avoidable.144 Increased financial strain on individual institutions and their 
budgets for infectious disease programs assures that such programs remain 
chronically underfunded and underperforming. While some studies have claimed 
that infection control is cost effective, these studies generally compare hospital 
costs or charges rather than actual reimbursement.145 Under Medicare and many 
private payor reimbursement systems, even these supposedly cost-effective 
programs probably lose money for the hospital.146 Infection control is not a 
revenue center for U.S. hospitals. The U.S. system offers billions of dollars in tax 
and patent incentives for new antibiotic production, but virtually no market 
incentives for conservation. Under the ACE program, providers would be 
rewarded for conservation, either directly through the Medicare reimbursement 
system or indirectly from drug companies wanting to achieve their own 
conservation targets.  
Finally, hospitals and other health care institutions have little incentive to 
cooperate regionally to support infection control. Infections pass between 
hospitals and long-term care facilities, and between rival institutions as patients 
and other populations circulate. Just as water pollution control is more effective 
when managed for the entire watershed, infections should be managed on a 
public health basis, a concept we call germ shed management.147 The Netherlands 
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provides clear evidence that a coordinated approach yields good results.148 The 
ACE program facilitates coordination by giving significant financial incentives to 
the patent holders who operate globally.  
In short, infection control and antibiotic stewardship programs sometimes 
succeed even in the face of the daunting financial incentives and institutions 
currently standing in opposition. If maintaining antibiotic effectiveness is a 
public good, then coordination should be facilitated among actors in a position to 
implement effective conservation, especially the drug companies and health care 
providers.149 This is where we believe that the ACE program we propose in Part 
IV can have a significant impact. 
B. Property-Based Incentives 
Apart from efforts at infection control and stewardship, some have called for 
additional patent initiatives intended to increase the supply of antibiotics by 
encouraging investment in R&D,150 even though patents as production incentives 
(Sector 1)151 are only one of eight possible policy solutions to the problem of 
antibiotic resistance.152 The patent system, which provides periods of market 
exclusivity for drug products, has long been the primary mechanism used to 
encourage for-profit companies to invest in new drug discovery and development 
in the pharmaceutical field.153 Pharmaceutical manufacturers use their market 
exclusivity period to earn extraordinary revenues on their products.154 Under the 
patent system, many important new drug products have been developed and 
marketed, leading to substantial public health gains, while the research-based 
pharmaceutical industry has remained a leader in earnings growth and return-on-
equity for its shareholders.155 
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However, recent studies have revealed important problematic effects of the 
patent system incentives on public health,156 and have even questioned whether 
this system contributes positively to the U.S. economy.157 The fixed patent term 
begins when the patent is filed, usually not long after the initial isolation of a new 
antibiotic molecule. As a result, manufacturers are incentivized to move their 
products to market as quickly as possible, and regulatory authorities such as the 
FDA are pressured to approve products as quickly as possible—both of which 
can lead to missed signals for emerging safety problems.158 After marketing 
approval, the fixed patent term encourages manufacturers to maximize their 
return on investment by promoting rapid uptake of the product. Drug companies 
have recently paid hefty fines for promoting drugs for conditions not supported 
on the drug label approved by the FDA.159 With the patent clock ticking, 
companies have a clear incentive to maximize revenues before generic 
competition appears.160 Such overuse is financially wasteful and can expose 
patients to risks of adverse events without providing them with the benefits of the 
drug.161 In the case of antibiotics, overuse is potentially even more troublesome, 
because it can speed the development and spread of antibiotic resistance.162 One 
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of us has previously characterized this behavior as “patent holder waste” if the 
patent holder’s overzealous marketing degrades the usefulness of the antibiotic 
before the patent expires.163 
With these general comments in mind, we consider a number of different 
proposals that have been recommended for adjusting the patent-based market 
exclusivity system to make investment in antibiotic R&D more lucrative to for-
profit companies. In large part, we remain critical of these patent-based 
approaches.164 
 1. Patent Extensions 
A number of Sector 2165 (patents as incentives) proposals offer to extend 
patent or data exclusivity periods for newly approved antibiotics. Patents last for 
twenty years from the filing date, but due to development and regulatory 
approval times, the effective market exclusivity life of a newly approved small-
molecule drug is usually on the order of eight to fifteen years.166 The U.S. 
Government Accountability Office at one time suggested that patents could be 
lengthened “to 25 or 30 years” for important drugs with “high therapeutic 
potential,” which would include certain antibiotic products.167 An alternative 
proposal that would accomplish similar goals involves starting the patent or 
market exclusivity term at the time of FDA regulatory approval, rather than when 
the patent is filed.168 Longer market exclusivity terms would provide sponsors 
with more time in which to earn revenues on their products. A few commentators 
recommend extremely long patent terms as a production incentive and also as a 
Sector 1169 conservation device.170 They suggest that excessive use of antibiotics 
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occurs when the owner of the intellectual property rights does not bear the cost of 
increased resistance in the future.171 Some of these theorists suggest that if 
patents’ lengths are increased, it is in the intellectual property owner’s financial 
interest to maintain low resistance rates so that demand for the product does not 
diminish over time. This is a variant of the patent holder waste hypothesis, 
known as the “patent holder conservation” hypothesis.172 
Patent-based initiatives seek to solve the antibiotic crisis by improving the 
potential revenues of the manufacturers, but it is unclear whether the financial 
prospects offered will encourage for-profit manufacturers to re-energize their 
antibiotic development. Using patents as a demand-rationing device is 
cumbersome, given the existing health care reimbursement systems in the United 
States.173 While companies with existing products will always welcome the 
financial windfall from a patent extension, the impact on R&D decisions is less 
clear. The financial incentive offered by longer patents is likely to be quite 
modest since the additional funds come from exclusive years at the end of the 
original exclusivity period, which translates to only a small additional net present 
value.174 Finally, simply lengthening patent terms does not provide manufacturers 
with an active incentive to change their behavior and delay profit-making. Since 
future spending on pharmaceutical products is unpredictable, owners of longer 
patents may choose to maximize revenues in the short term rather than promote 
conservation of the antibiotic resource.175 If there are other manufacturers with 
antibiotics in the same class, this pressure will be more acute, because bacteria 
can develop cross-resistance among drugs with similar mechanisms of action.176 
We are also concerned about the ancillary effects of extensions in patents. 
Such initiatives frequently produce unintended consequences, and in order to 
achieve socially desirable outcomes, careful attention must be paid to the 
                                                       
171. Otto Cars et al., Meeting the Challenge of Antibiotic Resistance, 227 BMJ a1438 (2008); 
Horowitz & Moehring, supra note 162; Kades, supra note 19; Stephane Mechoulan, Market 
Structure and Infectious Diseases, 40(2) CAN. J. ECON. 468 (2005). But see Longer Antimicrobial 
Patents, supra note 24. 
172. Legal Ecology of Resistance, supra note 19, at 164-165. Neither hypothesis has been 
empirically tested thus far. 
173. Vanishing Public Domain, supra note 19; Legal Ecology of Resistance, supra note 19.  
174. Longer Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 24. 
175. See Longer Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 24; Vanishing Public Domain, supra note 
19. However, some theorists suggest the opposite might occur. Horowitz & Moehring, supra note 
162; Kades, supra note 19. 
176. Anna Maria Ferrara, New Fluoroquinolones in Lower Respiratory Tract Infections and 
Emerging Patterns of Pneumococcal Resistance, 33 INFECTION 106 (2005). Resistance can develop 
across different classes, which widens the scope of the coordination problem. 
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mechanisms employed.177 For example, there might be global public health 
implications for antibiotic patent extensions in the Unites States, because the 
patent system on pharmaceutical products has been partially globalized through 
the World Trade Organization’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(TRIPs) Agreement and the increasingly complex network of TRIPs plus 
bilateral and regional trade agreements.178 Paul Hunt estimates that the globalized 
patent system has priced two billion people out of the market for patented 
medicines.179 If applied to the field of antibiotics, a new product might be less 
available to patients who need it in low-income settings.180 In addition to the 
basic health effects, any modifications to U.S. law would have to account for the 
difficulties inherent in proposing modifications to the global structure. Many 
would oppose such changes with respect to low- and middle-income countries 
given this concern that existing intellectual property laws can hinder access to 
patented drugs. Purportedly global solutions to resistant infections should also 
address the needs of these countries, where the majority of infectious disease 
mortality occurs. ACE incentives can be globalized by simply making the 
conservation and health impact goals global in focus. This can be achieved in the 
United States and Europe without regard to the quality of governance institutions 
in the developing world. The companies have extensive relationships with 
providers, institutions and governments around the world and would have a 
                                                       
177. For an example of using substantial financial incentives to achieve a socially desirable 
outcome that is rife with unanticipated consequences, see Aaron S. Kesselheim, Encouraging Drug 
Development for Neglected Diseases — The Trouble with FDA Review Vouchers, 359 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1981 (2008). 
178. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 
I.L.M. 81 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf; Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 UNTS 154; 33 ILM 
1144, at Annex 1C, art. 31(b) (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/ 
legal_e/legal_e.htm; Legal Instruments–Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 
(1994). Prior to the TRIPs Agreement, low-income countries could obtain low-cost copies of 
medicines under patent in the United States that were produced places like India and Brazil, where 
patents on pharmaceutical products were not permitted. 
179. See Paul Hunt, Human Rights Guidelines For Pharmaceutical Companies in Relation to 
Access to Medicines (2007) (draft for consultation, on file with authors); see also Oxfam, Investing 
For Life: Meeting Poor People’s Needs for Access to Medicines Through Responsible Business 
Practices 2 (Oxfam, Briefing Paper No. 109, 2007).  
180. This problem is currently being seen in the case of tenofovir disoproxil fumarate (TDF, 
or Viread), a newer medication used to treat resistant HIV infections, as countries are facing 
growing demand but high prices supported by TRIPs-based intellectual property regimes. See, e.g., 
Tahir Amin et al., Expert Review of Drug Patent Applications: Improving Health in the Developing 
World, 28 HEALTH AFF. w948 (2009). 
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financial incentive to use those levers to achieve the public health goals 
articulated by ACE. 
2. Transferable Intellectual Property Rights 
“Transferable intellectual property rights” (TIPRs) have been proposed as an 
alternative to patent extensions. TIPRs, or “wildcard” patent extensions, would 
be earned upon development of new antibiotic agents and can be transferred to 
other drugs to extend their market exclusivity periods.181 In the past, the IDSA 
has suggested applying them to the field of new antibiotic development.182 
Wildcard patents permit the sponsor to extend market exclusivity for a significant 
period of time for the most profitable drug in its portfolio, or to sell the right to 
the highest bidder. Such a market exclusivity extension, if applied to a 
blockbuster cholesterol-lowering drug such as atorvastatin (Lipitor), whose 
market exclusivity is due to expire in 2011, could be worth billions of dollars. 
Advocates of this proposal predicted that if a new antibiotic were developed that 
fully treated resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa, and if a two-year wildcard 
patent were applied to a blockbuster drug, the incentive would achieve cost-
neutrality within ten years.183 
There are a number of important public health problems with wildcard 
patents. The first is cost. Ten wildcard patents have been estimated to cost more 
than $40 billion.184 Even supporters peg the cost of the first wildcard at $7.7 
billion.185 The opportunity costs of an expenditure of this magnitude must be 
carefully considered: what other health programs could be underwritten for such 
a sum? We suggest the ACE program as one alternative. 
Second, decoupling of patents from the innovative product is likely to cause 
hardships for patients taking the drug to which the TIPR is applied.186 The 
                                                       
181. See Jorn Sonderholm, Wild-Card Patent Extensions as a Means To Incentivize Research 
and Development of Antibiotics, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 240 (2009). But see Kapczynski, supra 
note 40, at 264 (attacking the wild-card proposal). 
182. BAD BUGS, supra note 9, at 26. 
183. See Brad Spellberg et al., Societal Costs Versus Savings From Wild-Card Patent 
Extension Legislation To Spur Critically Needed Antibiotic Development, 35 INFECTION 167 
(2007). Notably, this cost estimate assumes that the drug would not have been developed absent the 
special incentive and ignores the opportunity cost of the proposal. 
184. See Longer Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 24, at 561; see also Kapczynski, supra note 
40, at 265-66; Kevin Outterson, Antibiotic Resistance and Antibiotic Development – Author’s 
Reply, 8 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 212-13 (2008).  
185. Spellberg et al., supra note 183.  
186. Longer Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 24 (“Wildcard patents would operate as a more 
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emergence of generic drugs and the resulting decrease in cost that occur after 
patent expiration have been shown to significantly increase access to drugs and 
adherence by patients to therapeutic regimens.187 Wildcard patents change this 
dynamic by delaying expiration of market exclusivity and derive their value by 
increasing costs on patients and payors of that other product.188 If applied to an 
essential drug that helps reduce the risk of recurrent cardiovascular disease, a 
wildcard patent may end up harming millions—a far greater number of patients 
than a new drug for a rare multidrug-resistant bacterium may help. If companies 
are permitted to sell their wildcard patents to other manufacturers, public health 
authorities are unlikely to scrutinize such transfers, which may include 
concurrent payments or transfers of other intellectual property rights that can 
further increase costs or limit access to pharmaceutical products. Since changes 
in U.S. patent law often have global implications, wildcard patents (and patent 
length extensions) also may extend the waiting time for patients in resource-poor 
settings seeking access to the product at marginal cost.189 
Third, the decoupling of patent rewards from the underlying invention is 
troubling on constitutional and policy grounds. An important potential 
constitutional objection maintains the novel, plausible claim that the patents 
clause requires the exclusion right to apply to the underlying invention.190 On 
policy grounds, the intimate connection between the exclusion right and the 
invention are important to the economic efficiency of the mechanism. The market 
for the invention itself should determine the value of the patent; likewise, patents 
on inventions with little utility can be disciplined by a low market return. 
Decoupling the invention from the reward through the TIPRs mechanism thus 
                                                                                                                                       
than US$40 billion annual tax on heart disease, hypertension, chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease, asthma, and depression to inefficiently cross-subsidize antimicrobial research and 
development.”). 
187. William Shrank et al., The Implications of Choice: Prescribing Generic or Preferred 
Pharmaceuticals Improves Medication Adherence for Chronic Conditions, 166 ARCHIVES 
INTERNAL MED. 332 (2006). 
188. Longer Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 24. 
189. Vanishing Public Domain, supra note 19. See supra discussion in Subsection III.b.1. 
190. A “wildcard” patent that gives an inventor market exclusivity in a different product may 
not meet the language of the Constitution that permits Congress to provide market exclusivity 
rights in “their respective . . . discoveries.” See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. As a counterexample, 
the pediatric market exclusivity provision applies to drug manufacturers who conduct clinical trials 
on the use of their products in children and provides six months of additional market exclusivity to 
that product. See Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 
111 Stat. 2296 (1997). This supplementary exclusivity mechanism is directly connected to the 
invention in a way that is more consistent with the Constitutional language. 
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unhinges patent exclusions from the key market test of their value, and 
substitutes an untested administrative process.191 As Amy Kapczynski noted, 
“wild-card extensions embrace the most difficult aspect of a prize design without 
offering the benefits that a prize system could provide.”192 The ACE program 
will certainly face prize design issues – discussed below – but the payoff is clear 
because companies are paid only if public health goals are met. 
Despite these concerns, a few members of the pharmaceutical industry 
consider wildcard patents to be the incentive mechanism “most likely to 
successfully stimulate new antibiotic development.”193 Other industry leaders 
have said privately that they do not support the proposal.194 Wildcard patents 
have been considered (and rejected) by Congress as a way of encouraging the 
creation of countermeasures for bioterrorism agents.195 At the time of this 
writing, it appears that the political prospects for applying wildcard patents to the 
antibiotic market are not great, perhaps in part because their policy and legal 
obstacles are formidable.  
C. Reimbursement Incentives Based on Medical Need 
Some proposals to enhance potential revenues for antibiotic drug 
development work primarily outside the patent system. A fundamental 
characteristic of market-based reimbursement of patented drugs is that the 
companies receive revenues based on their ability to sell drugs rather than actual 
improvement in human health. In countries with insurance coverage for drugs, 
the market is further disconnected from actual medical need. In countries with 
strong government health plans, effective healthcare technology assessment can 
provide better information to the market. For example, in Australia, England, and 
Germany, coverage for pharmaceuticals is nearly universal and the government 
exercises significant control over pharmaceutical reimbursement. But if 
purchaser market power is fragmented for pharmaceuticals (as in the United 
States) or if the patients are too poor to be salient consumers (as in low-income 
countries), then the patent-based system can be significantly disconnected from 
medical need. 
 Several prominent proposals tie research incentives directly to medical 
                                                       
191. TIPRs are really a variant on the prize proposals discussed in Part C below, but with the 
prize amount based on the value of another, unrelated patent. 
192. Kapczynski, supra note 40, at 266. 
193. Spellberg et al., supra note 183. 
194. Interview by Kevin Outterson with anonymous source. 
195. Biological, Chemical, and Radiological Weapons Countermeasures Research Act, S. 666, 
108th Cong. (2003). 
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need. James Love and Tim Hubbard have been leaders in delineating prize-based 
proposals geared to medical need. Love and Hubbard argue that significant prizes 
can create incentives for engaging in needed research. The public health payoff 
comes when the ultimate product is dissociated from its development costs and 
can enter the public domain immediately.196 As a result, a plan for distribution of 
the drug can be undertaken without the revenue-related concerns that can prevent 
dissemination to lower-income settings. These prize fund proposals could 
provide financial rewards that increase with the estimated social value of the 
drug, with the largest rewards going to developers of drugs or vaccines for 
neglected or undertreated diseases.197 Though still politically novel, and with a 
number of logistical and theoretical hurdles to overcome, these proposals have 
gained increased traction in recent years. In 2005, Vermont legislator Bernie 
Sanders first proposed a bill setting up an $80 billion prize fund when he was in 
the U.S. House of Representatives,198 and he introduced it again in 2007 as a 
senator.199 In the 2008 Presidential campaign, candidate John Edwards discussed 
a prize system alternative to drug patents,200 and in 2008 a proposal for prize 
funds was submitted by Bolivia and Barbados to the World Health Organization 
in response to a request by the Intergovernmental Working Group to develop a 
sustainable global health plan of action for research into essential medicines.201 In 
2010, the World Health Organization’s governing body kept this issue on the 
table in the ongoing work of an expert working group on research and 
development.202 
Two other prominent proposals follow similar tracks. Thomas Pogge and 
Aiden Hollis have proposed a global Health Impact Fund (HIF). The HIF would 
give companies the option to obtain reimbursement for drugs based on the actual 
health impact of the drug. The program would be voluntary and contractual, with 
payments coming from a multi-billion dollar global fund. Payments would be 
                                                       
196. See Love & Hubbard, supra note 40. [AU: There are two Love & Hubbards in FN 40. 
Which one should we cite to?] 
197. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Scrooge and Intellectual Property Rights, 333 BMJ 1279 (2006). 
198. Medical Innovation and Prize Fund Act of 2005, H.R. 417, 109th Cong. (2005). 
199. Medical Innovation and Prize Fund Act of 2007, S. 2210, 110th Cong. (2007). 
200. James Love, John Edwards Calls for Prizes To Replace Monopolies as Innovation 
Incentive for New Drugs, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L, June 15, 2007, 
http://keionline.org/content/view/87/1.. 
201. WORKING DOCUMENT PROPOSED BY BARBADOS AND BOLIVIA (2008), available at 
http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/b_b_igwg/working_document_barbados_bolivia.pdf. 
202. SIXTY-THIRD WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY, ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONSULTATIVE EXPERT 
WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: FINANCING AND COORDINATION, (2010), 
available at http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA63/A63_R28-en.pdf. 
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS XI:1 (2010) 
 
37 
 
allocated among the qualifying drugs based on the global health impact of the 
intervention, as measured statistically in Quality-Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) 
of the target population.203 Neglected and undertreated diseases would then have 
a significant blockbuster market without regard to the wealth or poverty of the 
patients. Drug companies would also receive financial rewards for marketing to 
maximize health impact rather than sales. The Health Impact Fund differs from 
some prize proposals in that it would operate as a complement to the patent 
system, at the election of the company. As a contract-based legal tool, the Health 
Impact Fund also falls into Sector 6.204 More controversially, the HIF would 
allow the sponsor to retain their intellectual property. James Love in particular 
has been critical of this aspect of the Health Impact Fund, as he claims it would 
undermine generic markets.205  
A third variation on this theme is the Advance Market Commitment (AMC), 
whereby countries, in concert with international aid organizations, commit to 
purchase a product meeting certain specifications as a production incentive.206 
AMC supporters argue that providing guaranteed demand can help interested 
manufacturers budget appropriately in the clinical development process, and can 
encourage companies to pursue promising late-stage products that might 
otherwise be abandoned for lack of demand.207 In 2007, Canada, Italy, Norway, 
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation modified 
this strategy by announcing a $1.5 billion AMC for vaccines aimed at 
pneumococcal pneumonia.208 This AMC is less ambitious than the original 
proposal, since almost all of the research and development work had been 
completed.209 AMCs are also Sector 6210 approaches, but must be negotiated 
piecemeal, with high transaction costs and the opportunity for process capture by 
                                                       
203. Thomas Pogge, Human Rights and Global Health: A Research Program, 36 
METAPHILOSOPHY 182 (2005); HOLLIS & POGGE, supra note 41; Hollis, An Efficient Reward 
System, supra note 41. 
204. See Table 1.  
205. James Love, Open Licensing vs. Monopoly Controlled Supply, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY 
INT’L, Apr. 27, 2008, http://keionline.org/node/88. 
206. MICHAEL KREMER & RACHEL GLENNERSTER, STRONG MEDICINE: CREATING INCENTIVES 
FOR PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH ON NEGLECTED DISEASES (2004); Cars et al., supra note 171. 
207. Ernst R. Berndt et al., Advance Market Commitments for Vaccines Against Neglected 
Diseases: Estimating Costs and Effectiveness, 16 HEALTH ECON. 491 (2006). 
208. Theresa Braine, Controversial Funding Mechanism To Fight Pneumonia, 86 BULL. 
WORLD HEALTH ORG. 325 (2008). 
209. Id. 
210. See Table 1.  
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drug companies.211 
All three proposals are readily applicable to the field of antibiotic research, 
but have limitations that require adjustments. Only the AMC is close to being 
operational, but the first test is limited to a product nearing the end of 
development. It has been criticized as resembling little more than a purchase 
contract for products already launched.212 Prize proposals face significant 
financing and implementation barriers.213 Nevertheless, these proposals may 
someday shift the current paradigm in global pharmaceutical development, and 
may be a fruitful area for research and policy articulation. Their application to 
antibiotics seems especially promising, as any movement towards value-based 
prizes or reimbursement will dampen company incentives to excessively market 
antibiotics. The first prong of our ACE program is explicitly an extension of 
these ideas to antibiotics, by paying prizes or increasing reimbursement to more 
closely reflect the social need or health impact of the drug. In all three proposals, 
we would add explicit conditionality, requiring the drug companies to meet 
antibiotic conservation goals if they are to receive additional funds.  
D. Reducing Financial Hurdles for Antibiotic Innovation 
Patent modifications and prize-based approaches increase the rewards for 
innovation. Another strategy is to lower the costs of innovation, through grant 
support for basic science research (Sector 6) and efforts to reduce regulatory 
hurdles to successful drug product launches (Sector 4).214 If costs are reduced, 
then perhaps the supply of new drugs can be increased. The Orphan Drug Act is 
an example of a legal mechanism to reduce costs to the drug sponsor during 
development, while also increasing potential revenues after marketing.215 As in 
previous work, we support expanded public support for basic antibiotic 
research,216 but here we also raise questions about any expansion of the Orphan 
Drug Act. We also review safety concerns with efforts to reduce regulatory 
standards in antibiotic clinical trials.217 
                                                       
211. See Light, supra note 40.  
212. Donald W. Light, Is G8 Putting Profits Before the World’s Poorest Children?, 370 
LANCET 297 (2007). 
213. Marlynn Wei, Should Prizes Replace Patents? A Critique of the Medical Innovation 
Prize Act of 2005, 13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 25 (2007). 
214. See Table 1.  
215. See infra Subsection III.D.2.  
216. See Kesselheim & Outterson, supra note 25, at 1692. 
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1. Enhanced basic science funding 
Basic research funding in infectious diseases218 can help to better categorize 
the biology of infectious diseases and the nature of resistance development and 
can also establish potential targets for antibiotic products. Such scientific 
investigation into the mechanisms of resistance can lead to more effective 
conservation programs.219 Current investments are remarkably sparse, with the 
NIH spending about $200 million per year on antibacterial resistance research.220 
Admittedly, upstream scientific investigation may take time to be developed into 
viable antibiotic end-products,221 but this way of supporting innovation is still 
critical, especially given the permanent need for new antibiotic development. 
Enhanced basic science funding should be an integral complement to any 
potential programs focused on the downstream drug development process. The 
funding opportunities provided by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
of 2009 are welcome steps in the right direction.222 
                                                       
218. Though such increased funding could come from any source, the greatest prospect for 
increased basic research funding comes from public sources. The NIH has maintained a 
commitment to basic science research over the past few decades, while the pharmaceutical industry 
has dedicated ever-increasing amounts of its research to later-stage clinical trials. Hamilton Moses 
III et al., Financial Anatomy of Biomedical Research, 294 JAMA 1333 (2005). Notably, the US is 
currently the worldwide leader in funding of basic science; the US directs about 6% of its total 
health care spending to biomedical research, far surpassing all other countries in relative and 
absolute terms. Id.  
219. Lipsitch & Samore, supra note 45. 
220. N. Kent Peters et al., The Research Agenda of the National Institute of Allergy and 
Infectious Diseases for Antimicrobial Resistance, 197 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASE 1087 (2008). The 
modesty of this funding is striking when compared to the cost of the wild-card patent proposal at 
$7.7 billion for the first drug: imagine the possibilities if the NIH research budget was quadrupled 
over the next five years, with sustained funding thereafter. 
221. Time from identification of receptors or pathways that can serve as the basis for new 
antibiotic targets to approval of a new product can take a decade or more. However, there is reason 
for optimism that this process can be accelerated due to recent developments in translational 
research, including high-throughput screening. Bernhard A. Müller, Imatinib and Its Successors – 
How Modern Chemistry Has Changed Drug Development, 15 CURRENT PHARMACEUTICAL. DESIGN 
120 (2009).  
222. Gardiner Harris, Specter, A Fulcrum of the Stimulus Bill, Pulls Off a Coup for Health 
Money, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/14/ 
health/policy/14specter.html?em.  
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2. Antibiotics under the Orphan Drug Act  
Investment can also come in the form of more direct savings to 
pharmaceutical manufacturers interested in pursuing antibiotics. For example, the 
Orphan Drug Act (ODA) template includes tax incentives and research grants, 
both of which decrease the cost to the pharmaceutical company of up-front 
investment in research and development.223 The ODA could be considered a form 
of federal cost-sharing for qualifying research projects. Under this legislation, 
however, the pharmaceutical manufacturer retains full control of the profits of 
any end product developed with the use of these government funds. In these 
cases, patients are arguably paying twice for drugs: first through the public funds 
supporting development of the innovative products, and second through the high 
prices that orphan drugs command from patients and public payors.224 An 
                                                       
223. The actual cost of drug development is a widely debated figure. Most pharmaceutical 
industry sources refer to figures from DiMasi, Grabowski, and others, that suggest that the estimate 
exceeds $800 million in 2004 dollars. See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New 
Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151 (2003). Other consultants for the 
pharmaceutical industry report the value is as high as $1.7 billion for a “blockbuster” drug. See 
Ashish Singh et al., Healthy Convergence, IN VIVO (2004), http://www.bainlab.com/bainweb/ 
publications/publications_detail.asp?id=17177&menu_url=publications_results.asp. But these 
figures are likely overestimates, particularly for drugs developed with initial investment from 
public research funding. These values have been criticized for including the cost of capital in their 
research estimates. See Arnold S. Relman & Marcia Angell, America’s Other Drug Problem, 16 
NEW REPUBLIC 27 (2002). Other estimates have suggested the real cost of new drug development 
averages closer to $240 million. See RUTH RUTTENBERG & ASSOCIATES, INC., NOT TOO COSTLY, 
AFTER ALL: AN EXAMINATION OF THE INFLATED COST ESTIMATES OF HEALTH, SAFETY, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONS (2004), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ 
ACF187.pdf. Still, these remain high figures, with substantial risk involved. Whatever the value, 
reducing unnecessary costs in drug development remains a worthy goal. See Michael Rawlins, 
Cutting the Cost of Drug Development?, 3 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 360 (2004). 
224. See MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW THEY DECEIVE US 
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (Random House 2004); see also Diana Porter, AARP Policy Brief, 
Pharmaceutical Companies Maintain Huge Profits with High-Priced Pills (2003), available at 
http://www.retiredamericans.org/docs/G1/profpills_issuebrief_final.pdf. This point is a subject of 
substantial debate, of course. See Frank R. Lichtenberg, Are the Benefits of Newer Drugs Worth 
Their Cost? Evidence from the 1996 MEPS, 20 HEALTH AFF. 241 (2001). But see Yuting Zhang & 
Stephen B. Soumerai, Do Newer Prescription Drugs Pay for Themselves? A Reassessment of the 
Evidence, 26 HEALTH AFF. 880 (2007). Most opponents of this view argue that manufacturer input 
is integral to the drug development process. We do not disagree with this point; however, we 
believe that the role of government-funded basic research is not fully accounted for in these 
estimates. 
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alternative system would seek better public returns on such investment in 
corporate research, either through limitations on prices from drugs arising from 
publicly funded research or a requirement that the ultimate manufacturer 
contribute a share of its revenues on these products to the basic science research 
commons.225 In the ACE program, the conditionality is unrelated to prices or 
revenues, but linked to public health goals. 
The FDA Amendments Act of 2007 set aside financial support for a 
conference intended to identify whether the incentives contained in the ODA 
might be extended to certain antibiotics developed to treat “serious and life-
threatening infectious diseases, such as diseases due to gram-negative bacteria 
and other diseases due to antibiotic-resistant bacteria.”226 Other groups have 
made similar recommendations.227 The ODA was passed in 1983 to encourage 
research focused on therapeutic agents for the treatment of rare conditions, for 
which a limited patient pool could otherwise prevent recovery of the investment 
made in product development.228 It is usually applied to diseases that affect less 
than two hundred thousand people in the United States, although companies can 
apply for diseases affecting more than two hundred thousand if they can establish 
that developing a drug for the condition is uneconomic because there is “no 
reasonable expectation” that U.S. sales could support development of the drug.229 
The ODA provides manufacturers with three primary incentives: 1) federal 
funding of some grants and contracts to perform clinical trials of orphan 
products; 2) a research tax credit of 50% of clinical testing costs; and 3) an 
exclusive right to market the orphan drug for seven years from the date of 
marketing approval. Through 2010, over three hundred and fifty products with 
orphan designations have received marketing authorization in the United 
States.230 
                                                       
225. Kesselheim & Avorn, supra note 82. 
226. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 1112, 
121 Stat. 823, 976 (2007). 
227. Spellberg et al., supra note 183. 
228. For a history of the Orphan Drug Act, see Henry A. Waxman, The History and 
Development of the Orphan Drug Act, in ORPHAN DISEASES AND ORPHAN DRUGS 135-45 (I. Herbert 
Scheinberg & J.M. Walshe eds. 1986).  
229. 21 U.S.C. § 360ee(b)(2) (2006). Manufacturers rarely use this option because it involves 
displaying their financial projections and business strategy to regulators and others who might seek 
to obtain the information through a Freedom of Information Act request. 
230. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, LIST OF ORPHAN DESIGNATIONS AND APPROVALS 
(2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/orphan/designat/list.htm; M. Miles Braun et al., 
Emergence of Orphan Drugs in the United States: A Quantitative Assessment of the First 25 Years, 
9 NATURE REVIEWS: DRUG DISCOVERY 519, 519-22 (2010). 
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Some commentators suggest “extending the Orphan Drug Act to 
antibiotics,”231 but the Act already applies to emerging products in this market. 
While the greatest number of orphan products treats cancer, many target 
infectious diseases caused by viral and bacterial pathogens.232 In the first half of 
2008, two of the sixty-one new orphan drug designations related to antibiotics. 
For example, one of the orphan drug designations was granted to Mpex 
Pharmaceuticals for an IDSA-designated priority pathogen, specifically for the 
“[t]reatment of pulmonary infections due to Pseudomonas aeruginosa and other 
bacteria in cystic fibrosis patients.”233 The designation was achieved without new 
legislation.234  
Thus, the emphasis on the ODA is curious, and it is unclear how modifying 
it for antibiotics might be implemented. It should not be necessary to loosen the 
ODA’s population limits for antibiotics because the two-hundred-thousand-U.S.-
person limit is not an absolute barrier. As described above, companies can gain 
orphan designation for larger groups if they can establish economic necessity. 
Empirical evidence suggests that this limit has not been a factor in marketing 
approvals under the ODA generally.235 The campaign to apply the ODA to 
antibiotics appears to ignore the history of FDA approvals under the Act.  
We also caution against any plan that calls for antibiotic orphan drugs to 
receive longer than the ODA-designated seven-year exclusivity term. The ODA 
has been hailed for promoting drug development for rare conditions,236 but to our 
knowledge no studies have demonstrated its overall cost-effectiveness.237 Some 
designated orphan drugs are used for broader purposes, which belies the rhetoric 
of orphan drugs. For example, the anemia drug epoetin alfa (Epogen) was 
originally approved in 1989 as an orphan product for anemia associated with end-
stage renal disease, but it has been used for many other indications, such as 
                                                       
231. A. Bruce Mongomery, Reply to the Antibiotics Pipeline—Challenges, Costs, and Value, 
351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2019, 2019-20 (2004). 
232. Braun et al., supra note 230. 
233. Id. 
234. Critics may note that the designated drug (levofloxacin) is not new, but this is hardly a 
warrant for the extension of the ODA. Many of the approved designations under the ODA are for 
new uses of existing products. For example, in March 2004, Merck received an orphan drug 
designation for rofecoxib (Vioxx) for “[t]reatment of juvenile rheumatoid arthritis.” Id. 
235. See Braun et al., supra note 230 (“The most common patient population size for orphan 
designations and approvals was fewer than 10,000 patients . . . .”). 
236. Marlene E. Haffner, Adopting Orphan Drugs—Two Dozen Years of Treating Rare 
Diseases, 354 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 445, 445-47 (2006). 
237. David Duffield Rohde, The Orphan Drug Act: An Engine of Innovation? At What Cost?, 
55 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 125, 125-43 (2000). 
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cancer-related anemia, as well as in patients with mildly low red blood cell 
counts but without symptoms of anemia.238 The manufacturer’s annual revenue 
for Epogen grew to $1.4 billion by 1996 and continues as a blockbuster more 
than a decade later,239 with sales exceeding $2.4 billion in 2008.240 Many other 
products originally protected by the orphan designation are used off-label and 
provide substantial returns for their sponsor, which calls into question the 
necessity of the ODA in these circumstances.241 One logical counterargument is 
that these off-label uses cannot be predicted at the time of drug development, but 
this misunderstands the relationship between the ODA and drug marketing. 
Qualifying for ODA status does not commit a company to apply for any 
particular label, but they will receive the additional incentives only for the 
specific ODA uses. With new drugs with sufficient patent life remaining, the 
ODA gives companies an incentive to apply for a narrow use affecting less than 
two hundred thousand patients per year to obtain the tax credits and grants. When 
finally approved by the FDA, the company can sell the drug to a much wider 
group, whether on- or off-label. Facing patent expiry in a few years, companies 
can take existing popular drugs and look for narrower clinical indications as a 
new orphan use. The primary goal for these drugs is the additional seven years of 
market exclusivity, which blocks generic entry even if the patent is expired. This 
latter group would also include drugs for which the patents have expired: the 
additional seven years of marketing exclusivity will block sales of rival generic 
drugs for that use, despite the absence of a valid patent. 
Rather than implementing an expansion of orphan market exclusivity for 
antibiotics, we recommend a thorough and independent review of the cost-
effectiveness of the ODA, including an evaluation of possible limits on the 
current ODA exclusivity term that ends when a new product is used for 
additional indications and becomes more profitable than anticipated. In 
particular, any modification of the ODA for antibiotics should be supported by 
careful empirical evidence of cost-effectiveness of the intervention, including 
                                                       
238. Surrey M. Walton et al., Prioritizing Future Research on Off-Label Prescribing: Results 
of a Quantitative Evaluation, 28 PHARMACOTHERAPY 1443, 1450 (2008). 
239. Geeta Anand, How Drugs for Rare Diseases Became Lifeline for Companies, WALL ST. 
J., Nov. 15, 2004, at A1. 
240. Press Release, Amgen, Amgen’s Fourth Quarter 2008 Adjusted Earnings Per Share 
Increased 6 Percent to $1.06; Full Year 2008 Adjusted Earnings Per Share Increased 6 Percent to 
$4.55 (2009), available at http://www.amgen.com/media/media_pr_detail.jsp?year=2009& 
releaseID=1248352. 
241. This is particularly true of oncology-related drugs. See Paolo G. Casali on behalf of the 
Executive Committee of ESMO, The Off-Label Use of Drugs in Oncology: A Position Paper by the 
European Society for Medical Oncology (ESMO), 18 ANNALS ONCOLOGY 1923 (2007). 
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opportunity costs. More fundamentally, an expansion of the ODA to include 
antibiotics targeting more than two hundred thousand people directly conflicts 
with conservation goals. The ACE program is designed to be a more carefully 
designed response to the unique needs of the antibiotic market. 
3. Reducing the costs of regulation 
Before new pharmaceutical products can be legally sold, they must pass 
approval by the relevant drug regulatory agency. However, representatives of the 
pharmaceutical industry have attributed the decline in new product development 
in part to the overly rigorous evaluative process required by the FDA, locating 
this proposal in Sector 4.242 For most drugs, the FDA allows placebo-controlled 
trials to support drug approval.243 However, ethics rules would forbid the use of 
placebos in people with serious infections.244 These studies utilize an active 
control, generally an approved antibiotic. Such trials are most frequently 
organized to demonstrate that the experimental antibiotic is not significantly 
inferior to the standard treatment; the relevant difference is referred to as the 
                                                       
242. See Martin L Katz et al., Where Have All the Antibiotic Patents Gone?, 24 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 1529 (2006); see also Alexander T. Tabarrok, Assessing the FDA via the Anomaly 
of Off-Label Prescribing, 5 IND. REV. 25 (2000). This argument was the intellectual underpinning 
for the Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach case, involving a claim that there was a constitutional 
right for terminally ill patients to access unapproved prescriptions drugs. Peter D. Jacobson & 
Wendy E. Parmet, A New Era of Unapproved Drugs: The Case of Abigail Alliance v Von 
Eschenbach, 297 JAMA 205 (2007). The argument found initial support in a three-member panel in 
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals before being overturned in an en banc hearing. Abigail 
Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 
2006), rev’d en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
243. The placebo-controlled trial is generally considered to be the gold standard for proving 
efficacy in clinical trials, but it can have numerous flaws. The FDA has long considered two pivotal 
placebo-controlled trials as serving as a reasonable basis for a drug approval decision. Alan Davies 
& Peter D. Stonier, Development of Medicines: Full Development, in TEXTBOOK OF 
PHARMACEUTICAL MEDICINE 310, 310-31 (5th ed. 2006). It has been criticized because the placebo 
can be an improper comparator that does not provide any useful information about a drug as 
compared to other therapies for a particular disease. Jerry Avorn, FDA Standards — Good Enough 
for Government Work?, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 969, 970 (2005).  
244. Robert J. Temple, When Are Clinical Trials of a Given Agent vs. Placebo No Longer 
Appropriate or Feasible?, 18 CONTROLLED CLINICAL TRIALS 613 (1997). Once treatment for a 
disease has progressed usefully, then it may no longer be reasonable to randomly assign someone in 
need of therapy to a placebo arm. David Knopman et al., Clinical Research Designs for Emerging 
Treatments for Alzheimer Disease: Moving Beyond Placebo-Controlled Trials. 55 ARCHIVES OF 
NEUROLOGY 1425 (1998). 
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“delta.”245 A non-inferiority trial design can be controversial depending on the 
level of the delta required by regulators to prove the drug’s utility.246 
Demonstrating non-inferiority with a low delta in a comparison with an active 
control means that more patients must be included in a Phase III study of an 
antibiotic to show a statistically significant difference.247 Studies with large 
numbers of patients are more expensive to conduct. 
Regulatory requirements directly relate to clinical trial costs, which are 
among the largest investments in drug development. 248 As a result, some 
commentators have suggested that lower regulatory hurdles may encourage for-
profit pharmaceutical manufacturers to return to the field of antibiotics.249 Such a 
move would both decrease the direct costs in premarketing studies and increase 
the expected returns from longer effective market exclusivity due to shorter 
regulatory preparation and review times. Norrby and colleagues recommend 
placing a greater emphasis on studies showing the properties of the drug and 
allowing extrapolations from data generated in one type of infection to others.250 
Baquero and colleagues suggest awarding limited marketing authorization based 
on earlier Phase II studies and beginning the Phase III studies while the 
                                                       
245. Larry L. Laster & Mary F. Johnson, Non-Inferiority Trials: The ‘At Least as Good as’ 
Criterion, 22 STAT. MED. 187 (2003). The non-inferiority trial, as with other facets of clinical trials, 
has been the subject of much investigation intended to make it more efficient for drug developers in 
the antibiotic field. Kem F. Phillips, A New Test of Non-Inferiority for Anti-Infective Trials, 22 
STAT. MED. 201 (2003). For a recent review by the GAO, see GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, supra note 104, at 1-32 (discussing issues with non-inferiority trials for antibiotics). 
246. Norrby et al., supra note 68. Recently, pharmaceutical manufacturers have expressed 
concern that the FDA is tightening the delta and clinical even further by tightening the statistical 
parameters. David M. Shlaes & Robert C. Moellering Jr., The United States Food and Drug 
Administration and the End of Antibiotics, 34 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 420 (2002).  
247. Mark Rothmann et al., Design and Analysis of Non-Inferiority Mortality Trials in 
Oncology, 22 STAT. MED. 239 (2003).  
248. Clinical trial costs are currently the largest driver of drug development costs. According 
to Moses et al., supra note 218, “the proportion of total pharmaceutical research and development 
expenditures (including those outside the United States) that has gone to clinical trials (phases 1-3) 
has increased from 28% in 1994 to 41% in 2003. In addition, the proportion of research and 
development funds that has supported phase 4 trials has increased from 5% in 1994 to 11% in 
2003.” One response from many pharmaceutical manufacturers is to move more clinical trials 
overseas to countries where patients can be accrued for lower costs. Seth W. Glickman et al., 
Ethical and Scientific Implications of the Globalization of Clinical Research, 360 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 816 (2009).  
249. See Shlaes & Moellering, supra note 246. 
250. Id. 
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antibacterial agent is already available for use.251 Livermore contends that 
historical controls can provide effective comparisons and proposes that approval 
be extended to related indications (such as infections or types of microbes) based 
on microbiological data, rather than additional human trials.252 
Despite these proposals for adjustments to the regulatory process, the effects 
of such adjustments are far from clear. Approved antibiotics usually have short 
mean and median clinical development times, as compared to other drug 
classes.253 In the United States, the FDA already has programs to speed its 
regulatory evaluation of important new antibiotics. First, the “fast track” program 
begins early in the clinical trial process.254 It is designed to facilitate the 
development of a New Drug Application (NDA) and expedite the review of 
drugs to treat serious diseases that fill an unmet medical need.255 Second, novel 
antibiotics aimed at multidrug resistant pathogens would also certainly qualify 
for the FDA “priority review” program, under which the FDA completes its 
regulatory review within six months after full NDA submission.256 For example, 
the antibiotic tigecycline (Tygecil), the first glycylcycline, received the benefit of 
both the fast track and the priority review systems.257 The FDA has also taken a 
number of steps in the last few years to streamline the regulatory process for 
approval of antibiotics, including publishing guidelines to help manufacturers 
design trials with less uncertainty about FDA expectations, allowing smaller 
sample sizes for individual studies, and actively working with sponsors during 
the early development phase.258 
                                                       
251. Fernando Baquero et al., Antibiotic Clinical Trials Revisited, 46 J. ANTIMICROBIAL 
CHEMOTHERAPY 651 (2000). 
252. Livermore, supra note 140.  
253. Joseph A. DiMasi, Success Rates for New Drugs Entering Clinical Testing in the United 
States, 58 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY THERAPIES 1 (1995); Janice M. Reichert, Trends in 
Development and Approval Times for New Therapeutics in the United States, 2 NATURE REVIEWS 
DRUG DISCovery 695 (2003). 
254. Janice M. Reichert et al., A Decade of the Fast Track Programme, 7 NATURE REVIEWS 
DRUG DISCOVERY 885 (2008).  
255. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, supra note 190. 
256. SUSAN THAUL, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: FDA FAST TRACK AND PRIORITY REVIEW 
PROGRAMS(2008), available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RS22814.pdf. 
257. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, NME DRUG AND NEW BIOLOGIC APPROVALS IN 2005 
(2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ 
HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/DrugandBiologicApprovalReports/NMEDrugandNewBiolo
gicApprovals/ucm081676.htm. 
258. John H. Powers, Antimicrobial Drug Development—The Past, the Present, and the 
Future, 10 CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY & INFECTION (Supp. 4) 23 (2004).  
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There are also important disadvantages to loosening regulatory 
requirements. Premarketing drug trials can help determine the efficacy of a 
product, but are often underpowered to detect important adverse effects.259 Such 
adverse effects only arise after the drug has been approved. However, in a 
number of recent cases, overly aggressive drug promotion has led many people to 
receive unnecessary prescriptions for dangerous prescription drug products that 
were later withdrawn from the market.260 The chance that an important safety 
concern with a product will be missed in pre-approval testing rises as regulatory 
requirements are lowered.261 There may also be risks to speedy regulatory 
review. Carpenter and colleagues recently showed that approvals of new drugs by 
the FDA made in the two months before a regulatory deadline were associated 
with more subsequent safety problems, suggesting negative consequences to 
imposing such deadlines on FDA drug review.262 Any proposal to loosen 
regulatory requirements, then, must be considered with a critical eye and with an 
appropriate view of the potential safety risks.263 Several of the recently approved 
antibiotics have demonstrated some important safety issues after marketing 
approval by the FDA.264 In fact, more than half of all antibiotics approved by the 
U.S. FDA in the two decades following 1980 were subsequently removed from 
the market, although not all explicitly for safety-related concerns.265 
                                                       
259. The “power” of a trial is related to the number of patients enrolled. For example, 
randomized controlled trials are designed with the appropriate power to test the primary outcome. 
If a randomized controlled trial is powered to test a primary efficacy endpoint, not enough patients 
may be enrolled to demonstrate adequately whether other secondary outcomes, such as safety-
related endpoints, are reached. Bruce M. Psaty, Clinical Trial Design and Selected Drug Safety 
Issues for Antibiotics Used To Treat Community-Acquired Pneumonia, 47 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS 
DISEASE (Supp. 3) S176, S177-78 (2008).  
260. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, The Role of Litigation in Defining Drug Risks, 297 
JAMA 308, 308 (2007). 
261. For example, orphan drugs are nearly all approved on an accelerated basis in small 
numbers of patients. While such parameters may be reasonable for orphan drugs, because the 
diseases these drugs treat are only found in small populations of patients, there are clinical 
implications for permitting accelerated approval based on testing in fewer numbers of patients 
(both proxies for less stringent pre-marketing regulatory requirements). An early government-led 
analysis suggested that 31% of orphan drugs on the market had demonstrated more pronounced 
side effects during pre-approval clinical testing than non-orphan drugs, and following FDA 
approval, 13% produced more side effects than anticipated. See Susan F. Scharf, Orphan Drugs: 
The Question of Product Liability, 10 AM. J. LAW & MED. 491, 504-05 (1989). 
262. See generally Carpenter et al., supra note 158. 
263. See Outterson et al., supra note 104.  
264. See Outterson et al., supra note 67. 
265. Id. Notably, this risk of subsequent removal from the market presents another limitation 
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Drug safety is a significant concern, which argues against weakening the 
antibiotic approval process. For some of the most essential antibiotics, it may be 
worth taking on these additional risks. At the same time, systems such as active 
post-marketing surveillance should be in place to assure that a product’s safety is 
being actively monitored.266 Provisional approval of antibiotics for a few years 
under close post-marketing surveillance is a possible compromise position that 
dovetails nicely with the ACE incentives described below. More broadly, the 
ACE program takes the financial pressure off companies seeking a speedy and 
possibly premature approval of an antibiotic. Under ACE, the companies will 
also have an incentive to act on their private knowledge of safety and efficacy 
issues for the benefit of public health.  
E. Conclusion 
The proposals that have been offered to address antibiotic drug development 
are limited by concerns related to their implementation (see Table 2). None of 
these alternatives sufficiently addresses the underlying trouble with the antibiotic 
market: that conservation and innovation incentives might negatively interact. In 
the next section, we describe in detail the ACE incentives, a panel of market 
changes that can help bring these incentives in better alignment. 
                                                                                                                                       
to prize funds that reward development of new products upon their approval. Our ACE proposal 
accounts for the possibility of needing supplemental prizes, but the primary rewards are 
incremental, as certain public health outcomes are met. Thus, a drug that is later withdrawn for 
safety reasons would not waste ACE incentive resources.  
266. Wendy Brewster et al., Evolving Paradigms in Pharmacovigilance, 1 CURRENT DRUG 
SAFETY 127 (2006). 
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TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF CURRENT POLICY PROPOSALS TO ADDRESS RISING 
ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE 
Policy 
category Strategy Examples Benefits Concerns 
Infection 
control 
Isolation beds, 
hand-washing, 
“search and 
destroy” 
programs 
Most direct tool 
to limit infection 
and resistance 
May slow but 
not stop 
resistance, 
limited 
funding, 
reduces drug 
company 
revenues 
Conservation 
Rational 
antibiotic use 
Academic 
detailing, clinical 
treatment 
guidelines, 
formulary 
restrictions, prior 
authorization 
requirements 
Addresses 
antibiotic misuse, 
some very 
successful 
implementation 
Programs are 
often hospital-
specific rather 
than system-
wide, limited 
funding, 
reduces drug 
company 
revenues 
Patent length 
extension 
Start patent at 
regulatory 
approval, extend 
patent term to 
more than twenty 
years 
Financial costs 
are indirect, 
valuable to some 
drug companies 
High costs for 
patented drugs, 
non-
transparent, 
rewards the 
wrong 
companies, 
may damage 
conservation 
Property-based 
incentives 
Transferable 
Intellectual 
Property Rights 
(TIPRs) 
Proposals range 
from six months 
to two years 
Valuable to large 
pharmaceutical 
companies, 
financial costs are 
indirect 
Transfers costs 
to other fields, 
non-
transparent, 
may damage 
conservation 
Value-based 
reimbursement Prizes 
Global prize 
funds, Health 
Impact Fund, 
Advance Market 
Commitments 
(AMC) 
Rewards selected 
based on public 
health gains. In 
some proposals, 
drug enters public 
domain 
Barriers to 
implementation 
and financing, 
questions about 
AMC capture 
by industry 
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS XI:1 (2010) 
 
50 
 
 
Enhanced 
funding for 
basic science 
National 
Institutes of 
Health, private 
foundations 
Develops basic 
tools and human 
capital which can 
lead to new 
antibiotics and 
better 
conservation 
No substantial 
concerns, 
though funding 
may take time 
to achieve 
results 
Specific 
development 
programs 
Orphan Drug Act 
(ODA) 
ODA has been 
credited with 
producing 
numerous drugs 
for rare diseases 
Already 
applies to 
antibiotic field, 
cost-
effectiveness 
not known, 
does not 
support 
conservation 
Reducing drug 
development 
costs 
Alters the 
regulatory 
review process 
Loosen FDA 
standards, 
accelerate review 
time, allow 
access to drugs 
before 
completion of 
regulatory review 
Reduce clinical 
trial costs, a 
potential barrier 
to antibiotic 
investment 
Safety 
concerns, 
accelerated 
resistance from 
early 
marketing of 
new antibiotics 
IV. THE ANTIBIOTIC CONSERVATION AND EFFECTIVENESS (ACE) PROGRAM 
The essential concept of the ACE program is to rationalize private incentives 
more closely to the ultimate public health goals. Our favored legal tool in the 
ACE program is contract: deploying insurance reimbursement, prizes, and grants 
for both conservation (Sector 5) and production incentives (Sector 6).267 We 
articulate the primary objective to be continued antibiotic effectiveness, which 
requires a balanced pursuit of both conservation and new production. A 
significant question is which institutions to target with ACE incentives. Ideally, 
the target would be able to internalize all of the negative costs from antibiotic 
misuse and the positive benefits from antibiotic conservation. The target should 
also have ready access to private information about antibiotic use. As we 
describe below, the drug companies appear to be best positioned to successfully 
integrate the disparate economic incentives in this field. The companies can act 
directly to induce conservation and can also influence others (such as doctors and 
                                                       
267. See Table 1.  
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hospitals) to follow suit. 
The ACE program emphasizes: (1) value-based reimbursement of antibiotics 
from public payors such as Medicare and Medicaid, with spillover participation 
from private payors (Sectors 5 and 6). These reimbursement changes will 
improve private markets for antibiotic effectiveness by giving significant 
institutional actors financial incentives to promote conservation and continued 
antibiotic effectiveness: (2) making these payments conditional on meeting 
realistic public health and conservation goals, including a Strategic Antibiotic 
Reserve (Sectors 5 and 6),268 (3) regulatory changes, including limited waivers of 
antitrust and self-dealing laws, to permit market coordination for conservation 
(supporting efforts in multiple Sectors), and (4) increased public grant support for 
basic antibiotic research, including both conservation and new production 
(Sectors 5 and 6).269 In this section, we discuss the details of these proposals in 
further depth and show how ACE incentives can be instituted without wholesale 
changes to the current drug approval, patent, and market exclusivity systems. 
A. Value-Based Reimbursement of Antibiotics  
The first plank of the ACE program is value-based reimbursement270 for 
antibiotics.271 The market undervalues antibiotics. The gross sales of antibiotics 
in the United States in 2008 were approximately $11.2 billion.272 Expressed as a 
percentage of the U.S. pharmaceutical market,273 antibiotics represent about 3.9% 
of United States drug sales. Given that low percentage, it is understandable that 
antibiotics accounted for about 3.6% of all U.S. drug approvals since 2000.274 
Antibiotic innovation is delivering about the number of new drugs that its market 
size suggests. The market places a modest private value on this important class of 
                                                       
268. See Table 1.  
269. See Table 1.  
270. This reimbursement could take many forms, including increased ex-manufacturer pricing 
or prizes awarded under contract. If reimbursement mechanisms were chosen, care would have to 
be taken to isolate patients and perhaps plan sponsors from the increased costs, perhaps through a 
reverse rebate directly from the government to the patent holder. If the goal were to minimize 
changes to insurance reimbursement systems, then a prize system is preferred. Prizes have the 
disadvantage of requiring separate financing, while reimbursement is built into the health care 
insurance system. 
271. Kesselheim & Outterson, supra note 25, at 1692. 
272. IMS Midas Database (2008 USD_MFN) ($11,195,825,230) (manufacturers’ sales prices). 
273. IMS Health, Top Therapeutic Classes by U.S. Sales (Apr. 6, 2010), 
http://www.imshealth.com/deployedfiles/imshealth/Global/Content/StaticFile/Top_Line_Data/Top
%2520Therapy%2520Classes%2520by%2520U.S.Sales.pdf. 
274. See Outterson et al., supra note 67. 
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drugs and companies respond appropriately. With present spending patterns, 
antibiotics are not in the top fifteen global therapeutic drug classes, ranked by 
market size.275 To demonstrate that the market undervalues antibiotics, we must 
compare the private value with some other referent. One possibility is the social 
burden of infectious disease in high-income countries. We calculate this value 
from the World Health Organization estimates of the disability-adjusted life year 
(DALY) burden of infectious diseases in various WHO regions. To translate 
DALYs to dollars, we provide a range of assumptions on the social value of a 
DALY, assuming that an additional healthy year of life is worth from $50,000 to 
$125,000 each. Table 3 (below) presents the results, suggesting that the unmet 
social burden of infectious disease in the United States and Canada is worth $73-
$183 billion per year. Providing $10 billion per year in ACE incentives would 
still be a terrific bargain for society if it reduced these DALYs by an even greater 
amount. 
TABLE 3: UNMET SOCIAL BURDEN OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE IN SELECTED 
HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES276 
Assumed DALY 
Value (in ‘000s) $50 $75 $100 $125 
Social cost 
(US/CAN) (in 
billions of USD) 
$73.3 $110 $146.7 $183.3 
Social cost (High 
Income Europe) 
(in billions of 
USD) 
$66.3 $99.5 $132.6 $165.8 
Total social cost 
(US/CAN & 
High-Income 
Europe) (in 
billions of USD) 
$139.6 $209.5 $279.3 $349.5 
                                                       
275. IMS Health, Top 15 Global Therapeutic Classes, 2009, Total Audited Markets, available 
at http://www.imshealth.com/deployedfiles/imshealth/Global/Content/StaticFile/Top_Line_Data/ 
Top%2015%20Global%20Therapeutic%20Classes_2009.pdf. 
276. Underlying burden of disease data from WHO 2008. Estimates by Outterson (2009). 
These estimates do not include the social value of averted infectious diseases in high-income 
countries. The cost of resistant infections is a much smaller subset, reaching approximately $30 
billion per year in the United States. 
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A second possible referent is the social value of the current health impact of 
antibiotics. The calculations in Table 3 are limited to the current unmet health 
need and do not include the current health impact delivered by today’s antibiotic 
treatments. Life in a post-antibiotic world would be remarkably more dangerous, 
with profound impacts on human health. If ACE incentives were able to merely 
preserve the current level of antibiotic effectiveness, this success would be worth 
tens of billions of dollars, if not more. The estimates in Table 3 might be far too 
low, underestimating the true social value of antibiotics. 
In short, the market as it currently operates places an inappropriately low 
private value on antibiotics and infection control.277 The reimbursement price for 
both should more closely track their social value. But the U.S. health care 
markets have many dysfunctional aspects; thus some therapies receive too much 
reimbursement,278 while others receive too little.279 Antibiotics have historically 
been priced relatively cheaply. Whatever the precise cause, a process for 
refashioning this system must begin with modeling the health impact of new 
antibiotics and pricing accordingly. For example, if a new drug led to a reduction 
in length of hospital stay for patients with a certain kind of bacterial pneumonia, 
a value-based reimbursement plan will return a percentage of these savings to the 
company. When used in conjunction with the conservation-based exclusivity 
discussed below,280 the company’s immediate financial success will be 
conditioned on the continued effectiveness of the drug. Conversely, as resistance 
builds on a drug, ACE payments will automatically taper. This approach begins 
to remedy the mismatch between social value and private value, which we 
identify as a central problem in antibiotic markets. Make no mistake: we are 
proposing a very substantial increase in payments for antibiotics, driven by the 
social value of these important drugs. The total monetary value of ACE 
incentives might be a net increase of several billion dollars a year in the United 
States, even as unit sales decline. In fact, declining unit sales would be an 
expected result as antibiotic conservation techniques received full stakeholder 
support with financial incentives. Reimbursement for the value provided by 
infection control and antibiotic stewardship activities undertaken by providers 
and public health authorities should similarly increase.  
Expert groups from a myriad of disciplines have suggested that drugs be 
                                                       
277. Matthew E. Falagas et al., A Comparative Study of the Cost of New Antibiotics and Drugs 
of Other Therapeutic Categories, PLoS ONE e11 (2006). 
278. Deborah Schrag, The Price Tag On Progress—Chemotherapy For Colorectal Cancer, 
351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 317 (2004). 
279. Robert A. Steinberg, Easing the Shortage in Adult Primary Care—Is It All About 
Money?, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2696 (2009). 
280. See infra notes 275-287 
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reimbursed in accordance with their value to society.281 In the United States, the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act created a federal agency to organize 
comparative effectiveness studies.282 The process of modeling the health impact 
of antibiotics and rating their utility is a logical task for such a body to undertake, 
with assistance from experts at Medicare and others familiar with large patient 
databases. The U.S. pharmaceutical industry has been critical of comparative 
effectiveness research, expecting that total reimbursements will decline and thus 
undermine innovation incentives.283 In the specific case of antibiotics, we think 
these concerns are misplaced, as the purpose of the ACE program is to increase 
the private value of these drugs to more closely mirror social value. 
B. Conditioning Reimbursement on Meeting Conservation Targets 
The second leg of the ACE incentive program links these enhanced financial 
rewards to appropriate use and successful conservation of the antibiotic. In 
addition to higher prices to the manufacturer (but not the patient), cash prizes can 
be used as incentives. The key concept here is conditionality, making the 
enhanced payments only if conservation goals are met at a population level.  
Insurance reimbursement and cash prizes are favored over patent extensions 
and additional marketing exclusivity284 because they operate directly and 
immediately with less discounting to present value. Insurance reimbursement and 
cash prizes significantly change the cash flow stream in all years and 
substantially alter the net present value of conservation management by the 
antibiotic sponsor. Unlike traditional R&D pull incentives, the time lag between 
company action and financial reward could be quite short with ACE 
reimbursement and prizes.285 By contrast, patent modifications may be more 
                                                       
281. See, e.g., OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, THE PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE REGULATION SCHEME 
(2007), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft885.pdf; HOLLIS & 
POGGE, supra note 41; Hollis, supra note 41; Love & Hubbard, The Big Idea, supra note 40, at 
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283. See, e.g., John A. Vernon, Joseph H. Golec & Steadman Stevens, Comparative 
Effectiveness Research (CER) and the Potential Threat to Pharmaceutical Innovation (2010), 
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uncertain from a company’s view since they provide projected rewards, 
discounted to net present value, and only if future sales materialize. In addition to 
being a weaker production incentive, patent modifications do not give strong 
incentives for conservation.  
Unlike other regulatory exclusivity proposals,286 the ACE program would 
condition payment to the continued effectiveness of the antibiotic. The sponsor 
can thus forecast a return on investment from managing antibiotic effectiveness 
for the long term. This incentive is likely to be much more cost-effective than 
patent modifications, because the amount of the additional incentive will be 
conditioned on meeting public health goals. Patents do not employ this condition. 
ACE incentives could also be tailored to individual drug-bug pairings and 
various levels of resistance, in order to prevent the antibiotic sponsor from losing 
financial rewards all at once. For a drug treating MRSA, for example, one target 
could be working to ensure that morbidity from MRSA in a representative 
sample of U.S. healthcare institutions remains below a set percentage.287 This 
proposal would give the drug companies stronger financial incentives to promote 
conservation tools in hospitals and otherwise manage antibiotics for population-
level public health.  
ACE relies on drug companies to rationalize this market characterized by 
asymmetrical information and irrational economic incentives. Focusing ACE 
incentives at the pharmaceutical company allows the company to internalize and 
address the dynamic cross-purposes that characterize existing battles between 
conservation and new production. One objection is that the company does not 
fully control the utilization of antibiotics, making ACE incentives a partially 
effective policy lever. We concede that drug companies cannot achieve 
conservation alone, but we see value in co-opting these companies to the cause of 
public health. The companies control the patents, possess significant private 
information on antibiotic markets, and control significant resources to influence 
prescription patterns. No other private actor can claim so much. There is 
                                                                                                                                       
conservation targets. If the time lag between company actions and significant resistance is quite 
long, then a time-lag discounting problem may also arise for ACE, necessitating a range of 
measures such as unit sales in addition to pathogen susceptibility.  
286. See, e.g., Roin, supra note 89. 
287. These targets could be designed by a roundtable of experts led by government, but also 
including representatives from academia, non-profit research groups, and industry. Sensible 
organizations to lead this target-setting group include the FDA, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS), and the Centers for Disease Control. Models for this type of cooperation and 
medical evaluation abound at the government level. One example is the Medicare Evidence 
Development and Coverage Advisory Committee, which provides independent guidance and expert 
advice to CMS on specific clinical topics. 
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substantial empirical evidence that pharmaceutical manufacturers actively direct 
drug product use through marketing. Pharmaceutical manufacturers devote over 
$50 billion dollars per year to promotional and advertising practices in the U.S. 
pharmaceutical market alone.288 These efforts include direct physician contact 
through sales representatives, advertising to consumers and physicians via the 
media, lay press, and industry publications, provision of free samples of 
products, distribution of consulting fees or other payments that may act as 
inducements to prescribers, and development of sponsored Continuing Medical 
Education conferences touting the benefits of their product that are required of 
physicians by state medical licensing boards. Studies have shown the impact that 
these tactics can have on physician prescribing behaviors.289 Promotional and 
advertising practices can lead physicians to prescribe more expensive, though 
less effective, drug products against expert recommendations.290 This effect has 
been shown to be especially prevalent among prescribers of antibiotics.291 
Currently, private financial incentives reward companies for promoting the 
sales of their antibiotics. As a result, pharmaceutical marketing efforts are 
exclusively directed towards increasing prescriptions of the company’s antibiotic. 
Companies can increase the sales of their antibiotic in two primary ways: (1) 
increase the overall sales of antibiotics (grow the market); or (2) shift demand to 
their drug from a rival drug (increase market share). Growing the market 
produces positive externalities for other antibiotic manufacturers, as the benefits 
from a growing market may spill over to rival producers. Growing the market 
also produces unclear health effects. If the additional use is not clinically rational, 
growing the market creates negative public health externalities through 
resistance. Antibiotic conservation directly threatens the market growth model.  
The second strategy entails several different characteristics. Increasing 
market share is positive for the company (additional sales, with fixed costs 
spread over a larger revenue base) and directly negative to rivals, who lose sales 
in a zero-sum game. Shifting market share from one drug to another may also 
have unclear health effects. If the better drug gains more market share, health 
should be positively impacted. The opposite is also possible: a company may 
convince physicians to prescribe and patients to take a less effective drug. Market 
shifts with negative public health externalities are perhaps more likely when the 
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older, more effective drug is generic and lacks a company champion with a large 
marketing budget to defend market share. Many of these questions are empirical, 
and the companies themselves control much of the relevant data. We emphasize 
that rational policy making in drug innovation will be difficult without either the 
cooperation of the companies or careful empirical analysis of the data they 
control. Under the ACE program, the companies will have significant financial 
incentives to use their private information and marketing resources for the benefit 
of public health goals. 
The companies may also be formidable opponents to new conservation 
programs. In recent years, a number of pharmaceutical manufacturers have been 
cited for aggressive over-promotion of their drugs.292 The efforts to encourage 
rational prescribing and develop evidence-based prescription guidelines have 
been limited because the investment in these public health efforts has been 
dwarfed by the pharmaceutical industry’s investment in marketing, which is not 
necessarily aligned with public health goals. Under the ACE program, 
pharmaceutical industry promotional practices (such as physician detailing by 
pharmaceutical sales representatives and Continuing Medical Education) would 
be refocused for a purpose more in line with public health needs. The ACE 
incentives would encourage drug companies to target clinically rational use of 
their products in patients where the drugs would reduce morbidity, while at the 
same time encouraging the sponsor to restrict resistance-inducing overuse of the 
product. Industry promotional practices would also be incentivized to encourage 
efforts aimed at promoting rational prescribing practices and infection control. 
For example, manufacturers might consider cooperating with hospitals in 
restricting formularies, rather than seeking agreements or other mechanisms to 
undermine the practice.293 The pharmaceutical industry marketing departments 
possess remarkable tools to influence physician prescribing practices. Under the 
ACE program, they would be turned into a mechanism for helping encourage 
proper use, not overuse, of new antibiotic agents. The government selects the 
public health goals, then the companies privately manage the process to achieve 
those goals.  
Other levels of the market could be considered for ACE incentives, such as 
the physician, the hospital, or the patient.294 By choosing the company, we 
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293. See Robert Pear, U.S. Warns Drug Makers on Illegal Sales Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
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deliver the incentive to the most powerful upstream player in the system, which 
then can deploy portions of that prize downstream, as they deem most 
effective.295 A drug company receiving a $100 million ACE incentive might find 
it cost effective to offer grants to hospitals with particular infection control 
problems, to the extent that such an effort helps the company continue to meet its 
ACE goals. Giving conservation incentives merely to doctors and hospitals, for 
example, pits them against the pharmaceutical marketing machine and fails to tap 
into the companies’ vast market knowledge.296 
D. Limited Waivers of Antitrust and Self-Dealing Laws 
Our final proposal addresses horizontal and vertical coordination problems 
in antibiotic markets. The biology of resistance does not respect the lines drawn 
by patents or antitrust law. Antibiotic resistance can cross multiple species and 
diminish the effectiveness of antibiotics both within classes and across classes. 
Resistance patterns are heterogeneous, which complicates conservation efforts.297 
Some private antibiotic conservation strategies would function better if 
manufacturers could cooperate horizontally in limiting the marketing, sale, and 
utilization of antibiotics with cross-resistance issues. For example, only two firms 
currently hold patents on commercially significant FDA-approved drugs in the 
fluoroquinolone class of antibiotics,298 but resistance to these drugs can easily 
affect other drugs in this class.299 The class itself should be understood as a form 
of commons, at least with respect to resistance. If the number of players was too 
large or transaction costs too high, perhaps regulation would be appropriate. The 
other option is private group coordination, which could be effective in this case 
given the relatively small number of sophisticated actors. If fluoroquinolones are 
to be managed for long-term public health, all of the relevant patent holders must 
work together to jointly manage the market. The patent owners (pharmaceutical 
                                                       
295. These payments may require exemptions from fraud and abuse laws and antitrust laws. 
See discussion infra Section IV.C. 
296. ACE does not require the companies to disclose their private market information. The 
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companies) must work together to conserve antibiotics.  
Competition law appears to forbid exactly this form of joint coordination 
among competitors. The pharmaceutical industry has received significant 
attention from competition authorities with regard to its patent and litigation 
settlement practices.300 In this circumstance, however, economic models of drug 
resistance suggest “a mixed competition/monopoly regime can perform better 
than competition or monopoly alone.”301 Likewise, hospitals and payors in a 
community might improve the public health by coordinating conservation 
activities on specific pathogens across all hospitals and payors, but might be 
reticent to do so given the possible sanction of antitrust laws. There are 
indications that authorities could be favorably disposed to such coordination. The 
U.S. Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice have issued joint 
guidelines suggesting health care joint ventures that would otherwise be 
anticompetitive might be permitted in narrow circumstances.302 Proper 
circumstances include clinical coordination to improve quality, which is the goal 
of antibiotic conservation. 
Therefore, our third ACE proposal creates limited conservation-based 
antitrust waivers. We propose that the FDA identify particular bug-drug pairings 
for which cross-resistance is a problem. The IDSA has clearly identified 
pathogens of special concern in the United States because limited therapeutic 
options remain. These pairings might be an appropriate starting point. The FDA 
would be empowered to issue certificates, in consultation with the antitrust 
enforcement agencies that would permit limited joint coordination of 
conservation activities for the specified product markets. The concept we are 
proposing is akin to structure of the safe harbor exceptions to the Anti-Kickback 
statute, which lists a number of activities that are systematically excluded from 
federal prosecution.303 In this case, the certificates would signal to private actors 
that joint coordination for antibiotic conservation was clearly encouraged, while 
limiting the potential for collusive mischief by specifying the qualifying drug-
bug combinations. In this vein, we also support extending marketing exclusivity 
to the companies, again conditioned on meeting conservation targets. So long as 
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firms are successfully managing the resource for long-term public health, they 
should be allowed to continue without the threat of generic entry in the antibiotic 
market. Generic entry adds another actor to the group that must coordinate 
activities, complicating efforts. If a company fails to meet the conservation goals, 
it might be appropriate to place the exclusive marketing rights into the hands of 
the government or another firm better poised to manage the resource.  
Limited antitrust waivers will create a forum for possibly collusive 
discussions well beyond these particular antibiotics. Perhaps the meetings should 
be public, to facilitate coordination amongst the downstream actors as well. In 
any event, the industry does not lack other opportunities for market discussions, 
and if collusion occurs in other drug markets it can hardly be blamed on the ACE 
program. 
In addition to this horizontal coordination problem, drug companies will also 
want to incentivize their downstream stakeholders to cooperate in their antibiotic 
conservation efforts. As a result, we predict that drug companies will more 
readily support vertical antibiotic conservation efforts in hospitals and physician 
offices, because the success of these programs will most directly determine the 
extent of antibiotic resistance development—and continued revenue generation 
for the sponsor. Likewise, hospitals and independent long-term care facilities 
share patient populations that could benefit from a coordinated effort against 
resistance.304 The self-dealing laws, including Stark II, prohibit many forms of 
financial relationship amongst referral sources.305 It may be necessary to create 
specific safe harbors and exceptions to permit vertical coordination of antibiotic 
conservation efforts. 
V. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES WITH ACE INCENTIVES  
A. Designing Value-Based Reimbursement  
ACE incentives need not be uniform. A powerful new antibiotic should 
receive a greater reward; me-too antibiotics with minimal value and doubtful 
safety profiles should perhaps receive nothing at all, or even be penalized. ACE 
incentives should respond to the health impact of the drug. This will be a difficult 
task, with many technical obstacles and the ever-present threat of industry 
capture. Any pay-for-performance or value-based reimbursement system shares 
these risks. We address them only briefly here. 
Building on the work of the IDSA task force, teams of infectious disease 
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specialists, in consultation with government and international public health 
experts, should establish targets for ACE incentives that consist of microbes with 
emerging resistance to current therapy and/or substantial public health impact. 
Expert groups should then attempt to identify the size of the potential market and 
health impact for the needed antibiotic in each case by working with government 
officials, representatives from the pharmaceutical or biotech industries, and 
health economists. Factors related to the disease target, such as its morbidity, 
effectiveness of current treatment strategies, and rate of emerging resistance, can 
be used to identify the upper and lower bounds of the public health goals and 
therefore the ACE incentive. Development-related factors, such as the ease of 
pharmacological research and rapidity of natural selection at the level of microbe, 
will affect the costs of development and pretrial testing. 
The population health goals for any new agent should be flexible, taking into 
account the dynamics of the health care system as well as the characteristics of 
the target microbe. A new agent against VRE may find a much easier 
implementation strategy in acute care settings in developed countries, where 
VRE is most prevalent. Using this strategy will require additional investment in 
improved surveillance of antibiotic use and development of resistance. At timely 
intervals, the same infectious disease experts and public health officials who set 
the ACE incentive targets will judge the success of the product in treating the 
infectious disease for which it was approved.  
Value-based reimbursement will also need to consider the structure of 
licensing agreements in the industry, which typically pay royalties based on sales 
during the patent term. ACE incentives should be considered sales for these 
purposes, at least as a default rule. For many antibiotics, the company marketing 
the product did not invent the molecule but acquired it through a license 
agreement from an inventor based at a university, non-profit research center 
(such as an academic medical center), or university-affiliated start-up 
biotechnology company. Some of the payments under ACE may not be included 
in the royalty calculations under some license agreements, which would be a 
windfall to marketer and a loss to the original innovator. The companies will 
have to amend their licenses, or perhaps a default rule could be integrated into 
the structure of the ACE contract itself.  
Finally, it should be noted that since the private value of antibiotics is such a 
small fraction of the social value, the amount of the value-based reimbursement 
system does not have to be finely tuned at first. As described above, the social 
value of antibiotics appears to be an order of magnitude higher than their private 
value. So long as clinically important conservation targets are set and the amount 
of ACE incentives are in the range of several billion dollars per year, we can 
expect that the resulting expenses will be well spent. The program may well be 
cost-effective within the health insurance sector alone, without even considering 
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broader positive externalities.  
B. The Strategic Antibiotic Reserve 
Limited periods of exclusivity, combined with value-based reimbursement, 
may not provide a reasonable potential market for some clinically important 
antibiotics. For example, a first-in-class antibiotic might need to be held in 
reserve for many years, and used only in the most urgent cases. We call this 
concept the Strategic Antibiotic Reserve (SAR).306 The clinical value of the SAR 
has already been demonstrated with the natural history of vancomycin, a drug 
that was inadvertently held in reserve for decades and is now a major antibiotic in 
helping manage MRSA and other extremely potent microbes.307 
Holding a first-in-class antibiotic in reserve might be the right answer for 
public health, but it will be a financial disaster for the company, especially if the 
unit sales are quite small. It will be difficult for value-based reimbursement to 
deliver hundreds of millions of dollars in annual sales for several years of very 
sparing use. If the social value of holding a new class of antibiotic in the SAR is, 
to assume an example, $200 million per year, it seems unwieldy to charge $1 
million each to two hundred patients (or to their insurers). Neither will longer 
periods of marketing exclusivity help much, since drugs in the SAR are by 
definition used only in extreme need and therefore the future projected sales 
revenue will be deeply discounted. The net present value of additional years of 
exclusivity after the patent term may be quite small.  
For this reason, the ACE program includes supplemental cash prizes for 
placing important new antibiotics in the Strategic Antibiotic Reserve. These 
amounts must be quite substantial in order to properly align incentives, ranging 
towards a billion dollars per year for an important drug class. Current candidates 
might include daptomycin, a recent antibiotic with activity against MRSA. An 
expert advisory committee should make the designation of which antibiotics are 
worth reserving in this way. The financial arrangement with the company will be 
entirely voluntary, based on a contract with the government. The amount of the 
payment should be value-based as described above to promote both innovation 
and conservation. If a company tried to hold out with a critically important 
antibiotic, of course the government would retain the ability to use a compulsory 
license, with payment of just compensation for the taking.308 
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C. Other Considerations 
1. Intellectual Property  
The ACE program does not replace the current patent-based exclusivity 
regime. Antibiotic patents are left in the hands of the companies. One exception 
to retaining patent rights might be the Strategic Antibiotic Reserve. For these 
drugs, an alternative model might be a voluntary government purchase of the 
patent for fair market value.309 A patent buyout would eliminate the company’s 
uncertainty as to the future value of the patent by setting a mutually agreed price. 
However, we see advantages to keeping the patent in the hands of the companies, 
even for a drug in the Strategic Antibiotic Reserve. A key goal of the ACE 
incentives is to co-opt the companies by giving them a continuing financial 
incentive to develop and sell antibiotics in line with public health needs. If a 
patent buyout severs that ongoing financial risk/reward to the company, then that 
incentive is lost. This is especially troublesome in the case where a company then 
markets follow-on drugs in the same functional resistance group, because the use 
of these drugs would reduce the strategic value of the previously-purchased 
antibiotic.  
It should be noted that we are limiting this discussion to antibiotics. Generic 
access to cheap antibiotics is not entirely positive for public health, even on a 
merely static basis. Cheap (or free) antibiotics drive resistance and reinforce the 
overall low reimbursement levels in this drug class.310 For other classes of 
antimicrobials, a different balance might be struck between patent law and 
generic access. Consider antiretrovirals (ARVs) used to treat AIDS. The 
reimbursed price for first-line treatment in the United States is very high, over 
$10,000 per year, while the generic price in aid programs in sub-Saharan Africa 
is less than $100.311 This huge pricing differential was a keystone is ramping up 
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treatment for millions of impoverished AIDS patients.312 This model was 
triggered by unlicensed generics produced by Indian generic companies. For 
these ARVs, public health demanded quicker access to generics.  
We have formulated the ACE program as voluntary, based in contract. New 
drug sponsors will have a choice of whether to enroll their patent-protected 
antibiotic in the ACE program. A voluntary system may be more palatable to 
pharmaceutical manufacturers because it is a less extreme step and gives them a 
veto. However, a voluntary arrangement is complicated by a number of logistical 
issues that might undermine the effectiveness of the ACE program. First, it 
would be difficult to incentivize adherence to ACE guidelines if a manufacturer 
were to refuse to participate and marketed their drug in a way that damaged other 
antibiotics through resistance. It might be necessary to control a rogue 
manufacturer through FDA restrictions on the sale and use of their product. 
Second, it would be complicated to manage the ACE system if it were to include 
some new antibiotics but not others. For example, the system may experience 
administrative difficulties if it attempted to limit value-based reimbursement to 
only selected antibiotics. It might be difficult to specify causal relationships in 
cross-drug resistance within and between classes. Similarly, limited waivers of 
antitrust law may be more difficult to manage if the owners of some antibiotics in 
a particular class were outside the regulatory framework. Most of these problems 
will wane as more companies participate and also as we develop better 
understandings of the underlying biological relationships in resistance through 
public investment in basic research. 
These issues may not be a realistic problem if the value-based 
reimbursement system was quite robust and generous. Hopefully, the companies 
will be eager to see increases in the reimbursement level for this class of drugs. 
Alternatively, the government also retains the power of eminent domain, with the 
condition of paying just compensation.313 Governments also have monopoly 
power as a purchaser. This is effectively the current market situation in countries 
where government payors dominate the pharmaceutical market, including the 
European Union, Canada, and Australia.314 Even in the United States, the role of 
government payors looms larger after the recent expansions in Medicare Part D 
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and Medicaid.315  
2. Access to Generic Antibiotics 
Under ACE, prices to the patient will not change. From a health plan and 
social perspective, an expensive but effective antibiotic that meets a public health 
need is preferable to a low cost but ineffective one, particularly in a country with 
an adequate social insurance scheme for drugs. We recognize the significant 
impact of high drug prices in low- and middle-income countries, which calls for 
full exploitation of TRIPs flexibilities and differential pricing to equitably 
balance access needs.316 It may not be necessary to affect the pricing in 
developing countries at all. The entire cost of the ACE program can and should 
be borne by high-income countries.  
As to the developing countries, if an impact on global antimicrobial 
resistance is desired, then the ACE conditions should include both domestic and 
international targets. Of course, if the companies are being asked to manage a 
larger problem, their financial incentives must be increased appropriately. But 
this company mechanism benefits from not being directly dependant on the 
quality of governance in the developing world. The companies are adept at 
getting things done despite weak governance structures. They could put that 
knowledge to work against global antibiotic resistance. 
3. Public Investment in Antibiotic Research  
Part of the ACE program involves enhanced investment in basic science 
funding that may lead to new antibiotic development. There have been numerous 
occasions where important drugs have emerged primarily as a result of public 
sector investment. For example, in the case of the anti-cancer drug paclitaxel, the 
NIH invested $484 million to fund research that eventually allowed Bristol 
Myers-Squibb to secure FDA approval for this compound. Bristol Myers-Squibb 
                                                       
315. Kevin Outterson & Aaron Kesselheim, How Medicare Could Get Better Prices on 
Prescription Drugs, 28 HEALTH AFF. 832, w832-41 (2009).  
316. Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in 
International Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 193 (2005). The 
TRIPS Agreement is a global floor of minimum intellectual property rights. TRIPS flexibilities are 
non-mandatory legal tools available to WTO Members to enable each country to balance the twin 
goals of innovation and access to medicines. Differential pricing in this context is the willingness of 
drug companies to modify prices based on the ability of the purchaser to pay. Wealthy purchasers 
pay more; low-income populations pay much less. 
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marketed the drug as Taxol, earning $9 billion in worldwide profits.317 As a 
result, we anticipate that improved public funding of infectious disease and 
resistance research will ultimately develop useful end-products, or discoveries 
that lead directly to the development of new antibiotics. In cases where new 
antibiotics are developed in part from public funding, it may be appropriate to 
adjust the value-based reimbursement level to reward the end-product 
manufacturer at a level commensurate to the amount of investment it has made in 
the development of the product. If the drug was developed solely with private 
funds, then perhaps the value-based reimbursement should allow the company to 
capture the greater part of the social surplus from the drug. For drugs with 
significant public support, the proportion would be lower.318 As a result, a larger 
percentage of the health care savings brought by the antibiotic would inure back 
to the government to help account for its investment drug development. This 
feedback mechanism supports government investment in the next generation of 
innovative drugs. 
One objection is that this model might discourage private acceptance of 
public grant funding, since the large pharmaceutical companies would want to 
avoid the conditions described above. We think this is unlikely. Most recipients 
of NIH grant moneys are universities and other non-profit research groups. These 
groups depend on grant funding in a direct, immediate sense and will not oppose 
an explicit license term that modifies potential royalties to account for public 
support. 
4. Cross-Boundary Antibiotic Management Issues 
The ACE program will need to account for the ability of microorganisms to 
spread resistance features across political and social boundaries. For example, 
overuse of antibiotics also occurs outside the realm of human medicine. 
Livestock farmers use antibiotics to increase production efficiency, which can 
                                                       
317. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: NIH-PRIVATE SECTOR 
PARTNERSHIP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAXOL (2003), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03829.pdf. 
318. Notably, there is a risk that manufacturers would use public funds for their research and 
then refuse to participate in voluntary ACE contracts. In fact, many highly transformative drugs 
have been based on extensive public funding and then distributed via private markets at high cost to 
consumers. See Bhaven N. Sampat, Academic Patents and Access to Medicines in Developing 
Countries, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 9 (2009). However, if the ACE program sufficiently alters the 
reimbursement scheme for antibiotics to provide manufacturers with a competitive rate of return for 
new products that are properly managed, we predict that this problem will be minimized. 
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS XI:1 (2010) 
 
67 
 
enhance profitability and also lower food prices for consumers.319 While 
antibiotics in livestock feed can help to promote animal growth, it has been 
linked to rising resistance rates in both animals and humans.320 In 2008, the FDA 
issued an order banning the extra-label use of cephalosporin antibiotics in animal 
feed out of concern for rising resistance rates.321 European authorities have 
moved more quickly to restrict animal uses of antibiotic classes that are 
important to human health.322 These animal uses currently serve as a source of 
profits to antibiotic manufacturers. However, under the ACE program, 
manufacturers of new antibiotic agents will be better incentivized to take 
resistance emerging from cross-species uses into account when considering how 
to optimize use of their agents, which should make such additional regulations 
less necessary. Low-value uses in the animal sector will be replaced by higher-
value uses in humans because the ACE incentives are conditioned on meeting 
public health goals. 
Another important cross-boundary issue in the implementation of the ACE 
program involves whether a national-level response is the correct one. In a 
globalized world, perhaps all resistance issues are global. The medical evidence 
is more complex, as usual. To an unexpected degree, resistance issues can be 
local. In the Netherlands, extensive programs at the national level have 
maintained resistance at quite low levels.323  In nearby France, Italy and Greece, 
utilization and resistance are much higher.324 The Netherlands maintains this 
gradient across an open political barrier, which speaks to the power of national 
                                                       
319. Gay Y. Miller et al., Productivity and Economic Impacts of Antibiotics Used for Growth 
Promotion in US Pork Production, 35 J. AGRIC. & APPLIED ECON. 469 (2003). 
320. Frank M. Aarestrup et al., Glycopeptide Susceptibility Among Danish Enterococcus 
Faecium and Enterococcus Faecalis Isolates of Animal and Human Origin and PCR Identification 
of Genes Within the VanA Cluster, 40 ANTIMICROBIAL AGENTS CHEMOTHERAPY 1938 (1996); 
Anthony E. van den Bogaard et al., High Prevalence of Colonization with Vancomycin- and 
Pristinamycin-Resistant Enterococci in Healthy Humans and Pigs in the Netherlands: Is the 
Addition of Antibiotics to Animal Feeds To Blame?, 40 J. ANTIMICROBIAL CHEMOTHERAPY 454 
(1997); H. Gregg Claycamp & Barry H. Hooberman, Risk Assessment of Streptogramin Resistance 
in Enterococcus Faecium Attributable to the Use of Streptogramins in Animals; Virginiamycin 
Risk Assessment (2004) (draft for comment, available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ 
AnimalVeterinary/NewEvents/CVMUpdates/UCM054722/pdf). 
321. 73 Fed. Reg. 38,110 (Jul. 3, 2008). 
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30, 1999), available at http://curia.europa.eu/en/actu/communiques/cp99/cp9948en.htm. 
323. Wertheim et al., supra note 148. 
324. H. Goossens, Antibiotic Consumption and Link to Resistance, 15 CLINICAL 
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regulatory and cultural institutions to shape resistance patterns in the hospital and 
the community. So while we concede that many resistance issues might be 
global, we also insist that many national efforts such as this one are not in vain. A 
successful implementation of ACE in the United States could prompt similar 
efforts in the European Union and other valuable pharmaceutical markets. As the 
largest pharmaceutical market, the changes we propose to the United States will 
have significant spillover effects in the world, both in the types of new antibiotics 
that are developed and in the effectiveness and commitment to conservation 
globally. Since most pharmaceutical company profits are derived from U.S. sales, 
the ACE program will change the marketing of antibiotics globally. Inappropriate 
overuse in non-U.S. settings may contribute to resistance development, so 
pharmaceutical manufacturers will be incentivized by the ACE program to 
appropriately encourage conservation of their products elsewhere. Given the fact 
that large pharmaceutical manufacturers commonly use promotional activities to 
drive prescribing practices in non-U.S. markets,325 we predict that their 
contributions can help stem antibiotic resistance arising from lower-income 
settings. If the value-based reimbursement is sufficiently generous, companies 
will manage the resources globally even in the absence of parallel efforts in other 
major markets. 
The ACE program can also be adapted to global needs. As discussed above, 
the U.S. government’s infectious disease advisers could keep global public health 
goals in mind when setting the conditions for ACE participation. Additional 
prizes could be contemplated for meeting global conservation targets. But these 
coordination tasks are complex, and the information on cross-resistance and the 
mobility of resistance may be difficult to interpret. We support the work of the 
traditional public health agencies of governments in this effort, but also suggest 
that the ACE program brings the companies on board as partners in these efforts. 
If the companies enjoy some informational advantages in these markets, their 
enthusiastic cooperation may be essential to continued global effectiveness of 
these drugs. ACE allows the companies to use this private information for public 
health, without requiring public disclosure. 
CONCLUSION 
We share the concern that current incentives for antibiotic development are 
inadequate, but insist that new models are required before the market can 
properly evolve. Public health goals and the goals of the private actors—
primarily pharmaceutical manufacturers—are woefully misaligned. Therefore, 
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we promote value-based reimbursement that includes grants and prizes 
supporting both the production and conservation of antibiotics in an integrated 
program that accounts for dynamic effects and maximizes benefits to society. 
The ACE incentives, which are grounded less in property and more in contract, 
will address many of the problems that promote antibiotic resistance, especially 
the mismatch between the private value and social value of antibiotics. The 
incentives are focused on the private actors best positioned to coordinate private 
information and internalize both positive and negative externalities from 
antibiotic use. Most importantly, all payments are conditioned on continuing to 
meet conservation goals. Together, this package improves antibiotic markets for 
long term sustainability, a task that is urgently needed to avoid the disaster of a 
post-antibiotic era.  
